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2NRODUCTION
      This thesis provides a comprehensive overview and some economic analyses of
the development and prospects of China’s stock market. The significant progress that
China’s stock market has achieved has been widely recognized around the world.
Based on a basic framework of China’s economic reforms and stock market
development, the thesis attempts to discuss several major bottleneck issues that
impeded the development of China’s stock market.
      It is my personal hope that this thesis will contribute to some extent to the vast
literature on China’s stock market with its most up-to-date information within a
systematic framework. China is experiencing rapid changes in all aspects of its stock
market, and almost all the research on this sector needed most updated data to support.
However, most of the research so far is limited to a historical overview of China’s
stock market, very few are recent enough to address the issues facing China’s stock
market, such as, state shares and legal person shares, A shares and B shares, as well as
the stock market under the WTO accession. This thesis will be helpful to those people
who are interested in studying China’s stock market.
      The thesis is organized as follows. Part I briefs China’s economic reforms and
their impacts on the emergence of the stock market, with a focus on financial system
reform. Part II presents a brief history of the development of China’s stock market.
After the overview of the stock market as a whole, the second part describes the main
compositions of the market, the primary market and secondary market, and provides a
discussion of the listed companies, securities companies, investors and regulatory
framework. It is concluded in this part that although the growth of the market has
3been impressive, they are still primitive and imprint many elements of the central
planning system.
      Part III addresses three major issues that obsess the policymakers and academic
circle, the non-tradability of the state shares and legal person shares, the segmentation
of A share market and B share market and the performance of the listed companies.
The author points out that some feasible measures on solving these problems should
be taken as early as possible. The last part reviews the process and prospects of
internationalization of China’s stock market. Section 1 and section 2 look at the B
share market and overseas listing as well as foreign participation. Section 3 points out
the gap between the China’s stock market and other emerging and mature markets in
the world in terms of market size, assets structure and market operation. The last
section of this part turns to a prediction of the impact of WTO accession on China’s
stock market.
4 PART I   ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE
EMERGENCE OF THE STOCK MARKET
From Planned Economy to Market Economy
      The economic system in China was highly centralized in the past. The government
initiated serious economic reforms starting 1978. The reforms were aimed at: a)
moving the economy toward greater decentralization of decision-making; b) an
increasing reliance on market forces and on material incentives in order to provide
motivation for the desired economic behavior and resource allocation; and c) the
opening of the economy to external competition through foreign investment.
      During the first period of reform (1978-1984), the decision to decentralize was
initiated at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist party held in late 1978. The measures aimed at state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) reforms were mainly focused on expanding enterprise autonomy and the
restoration of entrepreneurial financial incentives (fangquan rangli). In stage two
(1985-1991), the goal of the Chinese government was to change China’s economic
system to ensure that resource allocation could be dictated by markets to a greater
extent. In December 1986, the State Council proclaimed the Several Measures on
Deepening Enterprises’ Reform and Enhancing Enterprises’ Vitality, granting
experimentation of the shareholding system within large- and medium-sized
enterprises at both the provincial and local level. The pace of the reforms accelerated
dramatically in the early 1990s and the reform entered the third stage when the 14th
Party Congress, in late 1992, cast aside the concept of the planned economy and
proclaimed the establishment of a fully fledged market economy in China as the
country’s primary reform objective. After the 15th Party Congress in 1997, great
5importance was attached to the development of stock markets and as such they were
regarded as a major step forward in the governmental administrative program. This
policy was codified in the Ninth Five-year Plan and Long-term Program for 2010 for
the national economy and social advancement of People’s Republic of China (PRC).
State-owned Enterprises under the Transition
     On the eve of the reforms in 1978, decisions regarding current input and output
levels as well as investment were made at either the central or the local government
level. Until the early 1980s, state-owned enterprises relied totally on state budgetary
allocations or state bank loans for their production funds and investments. The state-
owned enterprises had to hand over all of their operating profits to the state treasury.
In 1979, with the introduction of expanded enterprise autonomy, the profit-retention
(Lirun Liucheng) system was adopted. The government allowed an enterprise to retain
sufficient funds from its profit to meet its decentralized investment expenditures and
pay bonuses to workers.
      Since enterprise profit was the main source of state revenues, the latter dwindled
as the enterprise share increased over the years. Government revenues declined by
two-thirds relative to output between 1978 and 1995.1 This is evident from Table 1-1
that shows changes in the savings levels of households and enterprises as well as state
budget.  From 1985, funding for basic capital investment was changed from state
budget grants to bank loans (Bo Gai Dai). The state-owned enterprises have come to
rely more and more on borrowing as grants have been cut back and bank credit
became the main financing channel.
                                                                
1 See Lardy (1998).
6Reform of Financial System
      During the pre-reform period, enterprise capital came from the state budget and
People’s Bank of China. The budget provided state and collective enterprises with
fixed capital and quota working capital; both types of capital were interest free and
non-repayable whereas People’s Bank of China provided them with credit to finance
beyond quota working capital. The control of state-owned enterprises’ money supply
was mainly implemented through the state budget and credit plan. The state budget
specified the amount of fixed capital and quota capital whereas the credit plan
specified the amount of credit to be allocated to enterprises.
     In 1984 a two-tiered banking system was created and People’s Bank of China was
transformed into a central bank only. Apart from the four specialized banks, the
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China and the People’s Construction Bank of China, many diversified forms of
banks and non-banking financial institutions were established, such as the Shenzhen
Development Bank, the Urban Credit Cooperatives, and the Trust and Investment
Companies. As of the late 1970s, investment funds originating from the budget have
gradually decreased, and the proportion of finance provided by banks has significantly
<Table1-1>  Composition of Savings, 1978-1991 (% of GDP)
                          Total                  Household                 Enterprises                Budget
                         Savings
1978                  33.2                    1.1                             17.0                           15.1
1979                  34.6                    3.1                             21.4                           10.0
1980                  32.3                    4.4                             20.7                           7.3
1981                  30.3                    3.4                             20.0                           6.6
1982                  31.6                    7.5                             18.7                           5.4
1983                  1.5                      9.9                             15.9                           5.7
1984                  32.8                    14.4                           11.8                           6.6
1985                  34.5                    13.4                           14.4                           7.0
1986                  36.1                    14.4                           15.9                           5.8
1987                  39.1                    16.2                           18.4                           4.5
1988                  38.0                    17.0                           17.8                           3.2
1991                  40.4                    18.7                           19.9                           1.8
Source: Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution, 1998.
7increased. As Table 1-2 indicates, prior to 1979, more than 60 percent of investment
in fixed assets of state-owned enterprises came from budgetary grants. By 1985, this
had decreased to 26.4 percent and after that it decreased further.
      From the mid 1980s attempts were made to turn these four specialized banks into
commercial banks responsible for their own financial profits and losses.   However,
banks were not yet entirely free to lend according to commercial criteria. They need
to devise and implement a coherent strategy for dealing with a relatively high share of
non-performing loans. More than 75 percent of bank loans went to the state-owned
enterprises in the name of “policy loans” (zhengce daikuan), to support the
development of state-owned enterprises. It created a large amount of non-performing
loans due to the poor performance of state-owned enterprises.  It was estimated that
such bad loans accounted for morn than 20 percent of the state-owned bank loans.
The banks have continued to extend new lending using funds from the People’s Bank
of China re-lending facility and from the steadily increasing deposit base. It indicates
not only a heavy reliance on distributed funds from the central bank, but more import-
<Table 1-2>   Major Sources* of Funds for Fixed Capital Investment in State-owned
Enterprise (%), 1970-1990
                         State budget                    Self-raised funds                  Domestic credit
1970                      75.3                                 23.9                                      0.8
1975                      64.4                                 34.9                                      1.6
1979                      61.4                                 31.1                                      3.6
1980                      44.7                                 36.5                                      11.7
1981                      38.6                                 42.4                                      13.6
1982                      31.4                                 45.3                                      16.2
1983                      35.9                                 43.5                                      14.3
1984                      35.3                                 43.4                                      15.4
1985                      26.4                                 40.4                                      23.0
1986                      22.2                                 38.4                                      22.7
1987                      20.6                                 38.2                                      24.6
1988                      14.7                                 40.5                                      24.2
1989                      13.4                                 42.8                                      20.9
1990                      13.2                                 42.1                                      23.6
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues.
Note* Foreign and other sources of funds are not included.
8antly a barrier to the change of specialized banks to genuine commercial banks as well
as limiting the development of the capital market.
     As a consequence, the state-owned banks are more and more reluctant to lend
money to state-owned enterprises when they have to be responsible for their own
gains and losses. Enterprises found that borrowing from banks became increasingly
difficult and came to demand new sources of financing. Meanwhile, a large number of
enterprises have been established and expanded, further fueling the demand for funds.
In 1995, the enactment of China’s new Commercial Bank Law meant to encourage
market-based management and pricing principles.
     In sum, as the economic reform deepens, the sustained growth and stability of the
economic development depend increasingly on the availability of new sources of
financing. The China’s stock market emerged, as the times demanded.
   
  
9 PART II   A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINA’S STOCK MARKET
DEVELOPMENT
An Overview of China’s Stock Market
     The development of China’s stock market is one of the most important elements of
China’s reform in the financial system.
      Form 1981, the central government began to issue treasury bonds to finance
deficits. Since then, various provincial and local governments, financial institutions,
and enterprises have also come to issue bonds. In 1986, the Shanghai branch of
People’s Bank of China set up the first over-the-counter (OTC) market in Shanghai.
The first stock sale in Shenzhen market was by the Shenzhen Development Bank in
1987. By the end of 1989, thousands of shareholding companies were set up all over
the country and issued 3.8 billion yuan (US$700 Million) worth of shares. However,
70-80 percent of the shares were from conversion of existing state owned assets, and
relatively little new capital was raised by issuance of stocks. Most of the stocks were
issued to related companies or to employees in the companies and fewer than 2
percent were public issues to general investors.
      In December 1990 and July 1991, two stock markets, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established. By the
end of 1991, 14 companies were listed in the two stock exchanges. This marked the
stock market’s entry into the Chinese economic system officially and China’s capital
market’s entrance into its formative stage.
     Since China’s two stock exchanges were established, two main types of shares are
offered by Chinese companies: A shares and B shares. A shares are exclusively sold
to Chinese nationals. B shares are denominated in renminbi but traded and purchased
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in foreign currency exclusively by foreigners. Besides the two shares, H shares are
issued by Chinese companies and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. N shares
– American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are issued by Chinese companies and traded
on the New York Stock Exchange in the form of American Depositary Receipts. S
shares are floated by Chinese companies and traded on the Singapore Stock Exchange.
The relative sizes of the final two types of shares are small.
     The state-owned enterprise shares are compartmentalized to ensure state control
while diversifying shareholding in an effort to modernize state-owned enterprises.
Share capital of incorporated state-owned enterprises is segregated into several
compartments, including the state shares, which are owned by the state and the legal
person shares, which are held by state companies or institutions as well as individual
shares. In general, the state shares and the legal person shares are subject to
restrictions on transfer. As the result, 65.89 percent of the total share capital of the
listed companies is untradable, leaving only around 34 percent of listed companies’
shares that are traded on the stock exchanges. The tradable shares are basically owned
by individual shareholders and only account for a small part of A shares, as figure 2-1
indicates.
                                         <Figure 2-1>   Capital Structure
                   Source:  http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRC/eng/esmintr.htm
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     After years of inactive transactions during the late 1980s, the stock markets
became quite active in Shenzhen and Shanghai in the early 1990s. Because very
limited stocks were available on the markets, prices rose very quickly. By August
1993, stock prices in both Shenzhen and Shanghai reached the highest level in terms
of the records of past two years and then dropped dramatically. The markets then
experienced more than two years stagnation and recovered only after early 1996.
From April to mid December 1996, the stock index rose by 120 percent in Shanghai
and over three times in Shenzhen. The government then took measures to cool the
markets. On December 16, 1996, People’s Daily openly warned the great risk
investors were facing with their speculation in the form of the special comments –
Understanding Correctly of Current Stock Markets. The stock prices fell considerably
after that day. But, contrary to some experts’ predictions, the market did not stagnate
for long and soon recovered and even reached a record high again in April 1997,
making the government find it necessary to cool it down again.  The quota of stock
issuance of 30 billion yuan in 1997 was announced. Then, the market didn’t recover
from more than two years of bearish behavior until May 19 1999.
      In sum, since the stock exchanges were established, the China’s stock markets
experienced several cycles of boom and bust and turnover levels on the markets also
experienced several ups and downs. It is indicated in figure 2-2 and appendix 1.
     China’s stock market developed quite rapidly. Compared to the initial 8 listed
companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and 6 on Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991,
851 companies had been listed on the two Stock Exchanges by the end of 1998,
having issued a total of 74.61 billion shares in the market and raised a total of RMB
355.31 billion (US$ 44.55 billion). The total from 1987 to 1998 can be broken down
as follows: (1) A share market: 34.302 billion shares (RMB 168.709 billion; US$ 20.6
12
billion); (2) B share market: 9.598 billion (US $ 4.745 billion) and (3) H share
markets: 30.719 billion shares (US$ 10.02 billion). (See table 2-1; figure 2-3)
      Currently, China’s stock market exchange trading system reaches all large and
medium-sized cities with more than 2,420 retail branches all over the nation. The
scale of securities trading is rising. By the end of 1998, the total market capitalization
was RMB 2,233.6 billion, equivalent to 24.5 percent of GDP. 2
      It is worth noting that the development of the stock market is accompanied with
the reform of state-owned enterprises' ownership and corporate governance structure,
namely, the reform of the shareholding system and incorporation of state-owned
enterprises. The stock market played a very important role during the process of the
state-owned enterprise reform. Establishment of the stock markets played the greatest
role in the promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises.  At the beginning, due to
the stock quota system and a limit of market capacity, many of the listed companies
were relatively small. Since 1996, the government expanded the scale of stock issuan-
             
             <Figure 2-2>   Securities Exchange Composite Indices in China
           
             Source: China Securities Newspaper, 1991-1997.
                                                                
2 See Zhou Zhengqing (1998).
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ce so as to support the capital demand of the large-, and medium-sized state-owned
enterprises according to the table 2-2.  Since then, a great number of key state-owned
enterprises, especially enterprises related to the strategical and pillar industries began
to issue their own stocks.
       In China, most listed companies are state-owned enterprises. By October 1999,
these enterprises have raised more than RMB 400 billion (US$ 49 billion) from the
stock markets, which has helped them improve their financial condition, promote their
technical creation, and expand their profit base. 3
Primary Stock Market
      As with the stock markets in other countries, China's stock markets consist of the
<Table 2-1>    Shares Offering from 1990-1998 (RMB Billion)
                                             1990   1991   1992   1993    1994    1995   1996   1997   1998
Shares Issued                        0.4       0.5     2.1      9.6       9.1       3.1      8.6      26.8   10.2
A Share                                 0.4       0.5     1.0      4.3       1.1       0.5      3.8      10.6    7.9
B Share                                                       1.1      1.3       1.0       1.1      1.6       2.5     1.0
H Share                                                                  4.0       7.0       1.5      3.2      13.7    1.3
Capital Raised                      0.4                  9.4     37.6     22.7     15.0    42.5    129.4   83.9
A Share                                 0.4                 5.0      19.5     5.0       2.3      22.4    65.5     44.0
B Share                                                       4.4      3.8       3.8       3.3      4.7       8.1      2.6
H Share                                                                  6.1       8.9       3.1      8.4      36.0     3.8
Rights Offering of A and B Share                         8.2       5.0       6.3      7.0      19.8     33.5
Source: www.csrc.gov.cn, 1999.
                          < Figure 2-3>   Structure of  Shares Issued
                       Source: www.csrc.gov.cn, 1999.
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primary market, in which firms make their initial offering, and the secondary market,
where shareholders trade their stocks.
      In China, an enterprise wishing to issue stocks may elect to arrange either a
private placement or a public offering. Public offering is public-oriented stock
issuance, in which all legal investors invest. In a private placement, an enterprise sells
its stocks only to a few designated investors, such as employees, financial institutions
or other enterprises closed to the issuers.
     Shares issued by a typical SOE consist of three types: state shares, legal person
shares and individual shares. Individual shares are tradable shares that are owned by
individual and institutional investors. State shares and legal person shares constitute
the majority of total shares.  Corporate employee shares and staff shares account for
only a small part of the total issuance. According to Provisional Regulations
concerning Share Issuance and Trading, the amount of corporate employee shares
issued may not exceed ten percent of the total shares outstanding. Corporate employee
shares cannot be traded until six months after the initial offering has been listed on the
stock exchange. Staff shares, however, which are issued by the company only through
the internal offering to finance, so-called targeting finance (Dingxiang Muji), cannot
be traded on the stock exchange. Since 1993, The State Council has stopped the
approval for issuance of internal staff shares. By the end of 1997, however, it was
estimated that there was still 1.55 billion untradable internal staff shares that had been
issued by listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange, accounting for 1.47 percent
of total shares outstanding. 4
      Public offering in China is quite similar to the Western practice. Before, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the State Planning Committee, the State
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3 See People’s Daily (November 3 1999).
4 See Zhou Zhengqing (1998).
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Economic System Reform Commission, and the People's Bank of China jointly
determine the annual stock issuance, which stipulated the total number of new stocks
to be listed on the exchanges. With the governmental reform, China Securities
Regulatory Commission became the most powerful organization with regard to the
authorization and supervision of stock listing and issuance.
      Because China’s stock market is still in its infancy, accession to the market has
therefore been strictly controlled concerning the checking and approval system and
quota system. As table 2-2 shows, during a quite long time, the number of stocks to be
listed was limited by the quota. The state competent securities authorities proposed
the number of new stocks for the next year in terms of macroeconomic financial
circumstances, development of state-owned enterprise reform and stock market
operation situations.  State Planning Committee implemented the overall balance of
the quota allocation at both provincial and industry level. Then, the quota was
allocated to provincial authorities and ministerial levels, and candidate issuers were
then chosen and approved at the provincial and ministerial level before being
submitted for approval at the central government level. China Securities Regulatory
Commission then reviewed all documents and determined the suitability of
qualification for being listed, and the time and size of the shares to be listed on the
exchange. If authorization is not given, the public offering will be aborted because it
will not be listed anywhere.
      In March 2000, the State Council promulgated the Rules on Approval for Stock
Issuance, the quota system was abolished and the checking and approval system was
also abolished under the new Securities Law instead of approval system only.
<Table 2-2>    Quota of Stock Issued, 1993-1997 (RMB Billion)
                                 1993                 1994                   1995                   1996              1997
Issuance Quota         5                          0                        5.5                     15.0               30.0
Source:  Introductory Theory of Securities Market, 1999.
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     According to the new Rules, the securities companies will select the candidate
issuers and then recommend it to China Securities Regulatory Commission with the
approval of local government. Based on Securities Law (Article 14), China Securities
Regulatory Commission shall set up a Public Offering and Listing Review Committee,
examining and verifying issuance application in accordance with law. Comprising
professionals in the agency and relevant experts specially engaged from outside. The
Committee shall cast votes over a stock issuance application and reach a resolution on
it.
     When a company issues stocks through a public offering, it must fulfill the
following requirements according to the Provisional Regulations concerning the Share
Issuance and Trading:
      All shares in companies proposing to issue shares to the public at any one time
must be of a single class and enjoy the same rights. The promoters of the company
must not have been found guilty at any time during the previous three years of grave
breaches of the law. They must hold at least 35 percent of the shares while making
contributions to the equity of the company equivalent to at least RMB 30 million
(US$ 3.7 million).
      The proportion of the company’s shares, which are offered to the public, must
correspond to at least 25 percent of the share capital of the issuing company. A ceiling
of 10 percent of the share capital applies to the number of shares that may be placed
among employees of the issuing company. Issues of shares in companies with share
capitals of at least RMB 400 million (US$ 48 million) may, subject to the approval of
the China Securities Regulatory Commission, carry out public issues of less than 25
percent of their capital but a floor of 15 percent is applicable.
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      China Securities Regulatory Commission also has a heavy hand in setting Initial
Public Offering (IPO) prices. To guarantee the success of IPOs, their pricing is
artificially set at a P/E ratio between 15 and 20, which is far below P/E ratios
(currently averaging over 40) in the secondary market.  This has made investment in
the primary market relative a risk-free event and has driven IPO underwriters to
compete fiercely. Based on Securities Law, in case premium issuance is adopted for a
stock issuance, the issuing price shall be negotiated and determined between the
issuer and underwriter, subject to the verification of China Securities Regulatory
Commission.
Secondary Stock Market
      At present, China’s stock trading system mainly consists of two stock exchanges.
Originally, it was made up of a group of independent local exchanges. With the
improvement of the stock market’s regulatory system and operational mechanisms,
China’s stock exchanges have developed into integrated marketplace with nationwide
coverage. 90 securities companies and more than 2400 stockbrokerage agencies in
large and medium-sized cities form a web for stock transactions all over the country.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are non-profit legal
entities governed by a board of directors and employing a membership system. Only
full members are allowed to trade on the exchange. Only institutions related to the
securities business can apply for memberships. Trading is limited to spot transactions,
and no futures transactions are available yet.
      To minimize paper works, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange use a computerized trading system based on the principle of price priority
and time priority. The system automatically matches the closest ask and bid and has a
18
capacity of 5,000 deals per second, equipped with the largest satellite-based
telecommunications network for securities trading in China.
      By October 1997, there were 559 members in Shanghai Stock Exchange with
5670 seats and 394 members in Shenzhen Stock Exchange with 1324 seats. More than
39 million individual investors had opened stock accounts in China. Annual turnover
was RMB 2354.4 billion (US$ 287 billion) in 1998 according to table 2-3.5
Listed Companies
      In the early stages of the establishment of Shanghai Stock Exchange and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the number of listed companies totaled only ten.
Consistent with speeding up the state-owned enterprises reform and the rapid
development of the stock market, the number of listed companies was up to 909
according to table 2-4 and with the total of raised capital RMB 394.9 billion (US$
49.4 billion) by July 1999.
     Listed companies were mainly distributed in coastal regions at the beginning of the
reform, and then gradually extended inland toward mid-west areas. Currently, the
distribution of listed companies covers almost all the provinces and municipalities in
<Table 2-3>    Turnovers of the Two Stock  Exchanges, 1992-1998  (RMB Billion)
                           1992       1993        1994         1995        1996        1997        1998
A Share              65.02      356.2       800.3        431.8       2105.2      3029.5     2341.8
B Share              3.11        10.5         12.5          7.79         27.99        42.66       12.65
Total                  68.13      366.7       812.8        439.97     2133.19    3072.16    2354.45
Source: China Securities and Futures Statistic Yearbook, 1998.
     
<Table 2-4>     Changes in Number of Listed Companies, 1990- July 1999
           1990     1991     1992     1993     1994     1995     1996     1997    1998      7/1999
SHSE   8            8         29         106        171       188       293       383      438        n.a.
SZSE    2           6          24         77         120        135      237       362      413        n.a.
Total   10          14        53         183         291       323      530       745       851       909
Source:  China Securities Newspaper, Jan 1, 1999; CSRC.
                                                                
5 See Zhou Zhengqing (1998).
19
China.
     An enterprise that wants to be listed on the exchange has to transform its structure
into company limited by shares and its setting up has to receive the administrative
approval from higher authorities, mainly from the State Economic and Trade
Commission. Listing requirements according to Company Law and Provisional
Regulations concerning Stock Issuance and Trading are as follows: a) It must be
company, which was established as or has changed its structure to that of a
shareholding company with the approval of the competent governmental authorities
and issued its stock to the public. b) The value of all issued shares (face value) could
not be less than RMB 50 million (US$ 6 million). c) The company must have been
profitable for the past 3 years. d) The number of shareholders who own more than
1000 yuan (face value) should not be less than 1000, and the proportion that is offered
to the public must account for at least 25 percent of the total shares. If the issuance
with share capital is over RMB 400 million (US$ 48 million), the proportion of public
issuance can be reduced to a floor of 15 percent.
       Since 1993, the government encouraged major state-owned enterprises to be
listed on the exchanges. In an effort to carry out national industrial policies and
reallocate productive factors more efficiently among industries and enterprises
through the stock markets, the policy of issuance of new stock began to incline to the
strategically important industries and the large-, and medium-sized state-owned
enterprises. In 1999, Zhou Zhengqing, the chairman of China Securities Regulatory
Commission, also promised the high-tech companies with strong growth prospects
will have top priority in upcoming listing. 6 Figure 2-4 shows that the categorical
structure of listed companies changed from mainly focusing on real estate, commerce
                                                                
6 See Semkow (1999).
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to raw materials, petrochemicals, information technology and other pillar industries,
such as automobile and electronics. For example, “Shanghai Automobile” and “Yiqi
car” have raised more than RMB 2 billion by initial public offerings in A share
market. Recall that A share, denominated in the Chinese currency, RMB, subscribed
for and traded in RMB by domestic investors. China wants to develop these sectors
not only to modernize its industries, but also to create new economic growth sources.
     A large number of listed companies have reached the head of their industries by
stock issuing, stock splitting, and merger and acquisition activities. The stock market
brought forth the emergence of China’s conglomerates that will be able to compete
with foreign multi-national corporations. For instance, at the time when Sichuan
Changhong was established in mid 1980s, its total assets were less than RMB 0.2
million     (US$ 25,000). After the transformation of its structure into a shareholding
company listed on the exchange in 1992, Sichuan Changhong’s asset-liability ratio
changed rapidly. By the end of 1997, it had raised RMB 2.9 billion (US$ 350 million)
and had produced 4.8 million TV-sets in 1996 only.
<Figure 2-4>   Structure of Categorical Industry of Listed Companies, 1998
            Source: Securities Times, December 18, 1998.
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     Statistics shows that state-owned enterprises have operated in a far more efficient
and profitable manner following the change of enterprises’ structures. From 1993-
1996, the average asset profitability ratio of listed companies was 6.85 percent, and
that of other state-owned enterprises was 1.97 percent. Average labor productivity of
listed industrial companies was 42.6 thousand yuan/per person, but that of non-listing
state-owned enterprises was only 16.4 thousand yuan/per person. 7
Securities Companies
      Before establishments of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, the Chinese securities companies mainly engaged in the trading of various
kinds of bonds. Since 1991, with the development of stock markets, the numbers of
securities companies grew quickly and focused their businesses on almost all the areas
traditionally reserved for investment banks. Stock issuing and trading have been the
main part of securities companies business.
      Securities companies developed very fast during the period of 1991-1996. At that
time, People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Finance and the Specialized Banks
established their own securities departments one after another. In October 1992, in
accordance with the boom of China’s stock market, the Chinese government
established three major securities companies, Huaxia, Guotai, and Nanfang in Beijing,
Shanghai, and Shenzhen, respectively. The securities companies that are backed by
banks gradually consolidated their dominating role in securities underwriting and
other securities businesses. The number of securities companies increased from 44 at
the end of 1990 to 87 by October 1992, and business related to stocks grew fast in
terms of business on bonds.
                                                                
7 See Zhou Zhengqing (1998).
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     The competition among the securities companies became fiercer and fiercer due to
the limit of listed shares and excessive numbers of securities trading agencies. Some
securities companies began to involved in speculation of trading of shares or futures
on the markets in order to survive. The over speculation and high risk in the China’s
stock market forced the government to adjust and regulate securities companies since
the middle of 1996. Securities companies were separated from the central bank in
order to assure the supervisory independence of People’s Bank of China. 47
companies have been separated from branches of People’s Bank of China since then.
From October 1996, 763 securities agencies were separated from other financial
institutions, such as commercial banks and insurance companies, by means of
rescinding licenses, transferal or merger.
      In November 1997, State Council determined that China Securities Regulatory
Commission took charge of the supervision of both securities companies and the
securities market, instead of People’s Bank of China. All of these measures paved the
way for the sound development of China’s securities companies.
      A surge of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of the securities companies has
emerged since 1996. At first, M&As happened as a result of the separation of the
securities industry from the banking system and readjustment of the composition of
securities companies, such as market entry permission and reorganization of the
securities companies. M&As also grew as the securities companies expanded the size
of their equity capitals, or merged and restructured the bankrupted securities
companies.
       The distribution of the securities companies geographically is corresponding to
the demand of the market. Only a small number of securities companies are located in
northwestern and southwestern parts of China consistent with the small number of
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listed companies there. However, in developed regions, such as Shanghai, Guangdong
and Jiangsu, the securities companies are not only evident in concentration
geographically, but also much bigger in terms of capital size as well as have strong
impacts on primary and secondary markets. Table 2-5 shows the distributive situation
of the securities companies.
      As for the size of assets, the average asset of 96 securities companies was RMB
1.66 billion (US$ 200 million) in 1996.  20 percent of the securities companies owned
80 percent of the total assets, around RMB 128 billion   (US$ 14.4 billion). The
average asset of these major securities companies was about RMB 5 billion (US$ 600
million). Table 2-6 indicates the total assets of top 20 securities companies. In 1997,
46 securities companies of more than 100 competent underwriters undertook the
underwriting of shares for 131 listed companies, of which, 15 underwriters occupied
74 percent share in the market.8
     During the short period of China’s stock market development, the number of
securities companies and their trading agencies increased at a rapid pace. But Because
of the small size of the capital, many of securities companies have been weak in resis-
<Table 2-5>   Distribution of the Securities Branches
Number of Securities Branches        Percentage (%)
Shanghai                     586                20.1
Guangdong                     416                14.26
Liaoning                     179                6.1
Jiangsu                     158                5.4
Sichuang                     154                5.3
Zhejiang                     150                5.14
Beijing                     149                5.11
Hubei                     130                4.46
Shandong                     109                3.7
Tianjing                     93                3.2
Total                     2124                72.8
Source: China Securities Newspaper, April 1, 1998.
                                                                
8 See Choices Facing the 21st Century  (1999).
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ting the risks in the stock market. And also due to the overlapping business lines
among the securities companies as well as the imbalance of market shares, resulted in
the serious pressures of the long-term buyer’s market. It can be predicted that a new
surge of M&As among China’s securities companies will emerge in the near future.
Meanwhile, compared to the well-known investment banks in the world, the size of
the capital of China’s securities companies is pitifully small. For instance, in 1997, the
total asset of Merrill Lynch Inc. was US$ 292.819 billion. At the same time, the total
assets of all the 90 domestic securities companies were only around RMB 200 billion
(US$ 24.4 billion).9 The new surge of M&As will also happen due to fiercer
competition caused by immigration of foreign investment banks after China joins the
WTO and GATS.
Investors
      As table 2-7 shows, the number of investors has increased at an amazing speed in
China. From 1992-1998, the number of investors increased by a factor of 18.
However, contrasted with the mature stock markets, the proportion of institutional
investors in China is quite small according to table 2-8. In particular, the investment
<Table 2-6>  Total Assets of the Top 20 Securities Companies, 1998 (RMB billion)
Position Name T- Assets Position Name T- Assets
1 Junan 17.56 11 Jiangsu 4.81
2 Shenwang 16.73 12 Guoxin 4.54
3 Nanfang 15.53 13 Zhongxin 4.12
4 Huaxia 11.06 14 Guangdong 4.06
5 Haitong 10.27 15 Dapeng 4.03
6 Guangfa 6.91 16 Shandong 4.0
7 Anshan 6.5 17 Guangda 3.12
8 Shanghai 5.68 18 Zhaoyin 3.0
9 Lianhe 5.43 19 Beijing 2.52
10 Guotai 5.1 20 Hubei 2.45
Source: Securities Industry, July 1998.
                                                                
9 See Tian Baoliang  (2000).
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funds, which have already played an important role in the mature market, are
extremely small in China. The majority of investors are individual investors.
     The fluctuation of China’s stock markets to date, while attributable to a number of
factors, can be viewed as a function of their continued small size and consequent
vulnerability to manipulation.  On the one hand, companies listed on the exchange
were subject to government approval. Because very limited stocks were available on
the market, the P/E ratios of quite a few stocks could be as high as over 500 or even
above 1000. On the other hand, as the individual investors are poorly informed and
have little understanding of the stock fundamentals, they would bid up the prices of
the stocks that were in scare supply. Many people perceived that the government
would not allow the price to go down and it would go up and up.  Investing in stocks
seemed to be a low-risk and high-return option for many investors without realizing
the inherent risks.
      Since 1980s, the increase in institutional investors represented by pension funds,
insurance funds and mutual funds was rapid in western countries’ stock markets.
Statistics showed that the total assets of institutional investors in the countries of the
<Table 2-7>    Increase in the Number of Investors, 1992-1998  ( Million)
                     1992          1993          1994          1995          1996          1997          1998
Number        2.1665       7.7766      10.5898      12.4247     23.0723     33.3333     39.107
Source: Choices Facing the 21st Century, China’s Securities Industry Association,
1999.
<Table 2-8>   Structure of Investors, 1998  (Million)
                                       Shanghai                       Shenzhen                         Total
Institution                       0.0626                           0.0932                             0.1558
Individual                       19.9271                         19.0241                           38.9519
Total                               19.9897                         19.1173                           39.107
Source: www.csrc.gov.cn, 1999.
26
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) increased from
US$ 32,000 billion in 1981 to US$ 243,000 billion in 1995. At the same time the total
market value for shares in the world market was US$ 180,000. The institutional
investors played the main role in the stock markets at the time when their assets
increased to an astonishing level. In the United States, institutional investors owned
more than 50 percent of all shares, which accounted for three-quarters of total
turnover on the New York Stock Exchange.
     In China, the number of institutional investors is very small. Besides
unsophisticated individual investors, the mature and sophisticated institutional
investors have not developed. In November 1997, China Securities Regulatory
Commission promulgated the new Provisional Regulations on Securities Investment
Funds. Fourteen funds have since been established under the Regulations, raising a
total of RMB 32 billion (US$ 3.9 billion) by the end of 1999. Of the 14 funds, the first
10 were each capitalized with RMB 2 billion (US$ 244 million), accounting for 0.25
percent of the total market value of RMB 800 billion (US$ 97.6 billion) in A share
market.10 By October 1996 it was reported that China had 75 officially approved
funds of which 22 were listed. The largest was the Tianjin fund only with RMB 580
million (US$ 70.7 million), while the smallest one only 10 million (US$ 1.2 million).
Compared to 1,473 funds authorized for sale in Hong Kong at the end of 1997 (with a
total net asset value of approximately HK$ 1,000 billion), the potential for developing
the investment fund industry in China is immense.
     The Provisional Regulations on Securities Investment Funds have established
relatively clear and concise rules governing the establishment and operation of
investment funds and, to a large extent. It has provided a framework within which
                                                                
10 See Millward and Qiao (1999).
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participants’ rights are clearly defined, albeit under the overall supervisory and
discretionary control of China Securities Regulatory Commission.
      Lack of sophisticated institutional and individual investors in China illustrates the
rampant speculative behaviors on the markets.  Firstly, there is a high transfer rate in
stock trading, which is much higher than that of mature markets. Secondly, the
manipulation of the stock markets happens quite often. Some institutional investors or
individual “big accounts” (Dahu) control stock prices by taking advantage of their big
amount of capital and information. In many cases, this kind of behavior is usually
under some kind of agreement, or even supported by the listed companies.
Regulatory Framework
China Securities Regulatory Commission
      At the beginning of the establishment of Chinese stock markets, due to the lack of
regulation and supervision, China’s stock markets were driven primarily by rumor and
speculation. Legislation on securities came under the jurisdiction of a number of
ministries and commissions under the State Council. There was not only an
overlapping of legislative power, but also a lack of demarcation of the administrative
and supervisory functions at different levels and in different departments. Because of
multiple regulators, there exists high transaction costs and low efficiency.
      In October 1992, the establishment of State Council Securities Commission and
China Securities Regulatory Commission marked the formation of this regulatory
body.  The State Council Securities Commission is the state authority responsible for
exercising centralized market regulation. The China Securities Regulatory
Commission is its executive arm responsible for conducting supervision and
regulation of the securities markets in accordance with the law.
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      The State Council Securities Commission and China Securities Regulatory
Commission gradually monopolized their administration over the markets year by
year. However, they shared their regulatory powers initially with People’s Bank of
China and several competent government agencies. The large number of regulators
made for high transaction costs for companies seeking listing.  In November 1998, the
state held the National Finance Conference and decided to reform and reorganize the
national securities regulatory mechanism. The central securities authority will
supervise local securities regulatory departments directly. Organizations engaging in
securities businesses that were formerly supervised by People’s Bank of China were
put under the centralized supervision of China Securities Regulatory Commission.
      In April 1998, pursuant to the State Council Reform Plan, the State council
Securities Commission and the China Securities Regulatory Commission were
merged to form one ministry rank unit directly under the State Council. Both the
power and the functions of the China Securities Regulatory Commission have been
strengthened following the reform. A centralized securities supervisory system was
thus established.
    China Securities Regulatory Commission had gradually been accumulating power
in the years leading up to the law’s passage, and the new Securities Law further
strengthens its position. The Law formally grants China Securities Regulatory
Commission many of the powers it is already exercising, but for which it previously
lacked a clear legal basis. As a result, China Securities Regulatory Commission now
enjoys legislative, administrative, supervisory, regulatory, investigative and
disciplinary powers in the securities sector, subject to only a few restrictions.
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Legislation Related to the Stock Markets
       For years, in an effort to regulate China’s stock market, the fundamental system
of regulation of the stock market has gradually taken shape. The legislation of stock
markets in China went into a new stage after the establishments of State Council
Securities Commission and China Securities Regulatory Commission. Since 1993, the
state promulgated a series of regulations and measures.
      In April 1993, the State Council issued the first important regulation of China’s
stock market – Provisional Regulations concerning Stock Issuance and Trading. The
regulation provided formal nation-wide standards for stock transactions in China. It
addresses such matters as stock issues and trading, takeovers, custody, clearance and
registration of shares, information disclosure, inspection and penalties, and dispute
resolution. The newly amended Criminal Law in 1997 added to provisions on
securities crime and its penalties, which ended the history of a lack of a systematic
criminal measures to safeguard the stock market in China.
      On July 1 1994, the Company Law of PRC became effective. This is the first law
that regulated corporations and listed companies as well as shares issues. The
Company Law organizes the basic corporate framework in which shares and bonds
may be issued and transferred. For instance, the Company Law indicates which forms
of company may issue shares and bonds to the public, the internal corporate
procedures to be completed to approve such issues, how registered and bearer shares
and bonds are transferred, under what circumstances shares may listed and traded on
stock exchanges.
      The landmark Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Qualifications of
Domestic and Foreign Securities Institutions Dealing in Foreign Investment Shares
became effective on December 1, 1996. The regulations aim to standardize the
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qualifications of domestic and foreign securities institutions, such as brokerages and
underwriters, that deal in foreign investment shares listed on the Chinese market and
domestic securities institutions that deal in foreign investment share listed outside
China.
       The Provisional Regulations Banning Entrance into the Securities Industry was
promulgated in March 1997. The Regulations outline various securities violations for
professionals working in the securities industry. China Securities Regulatory
Commission may determine that directors and other senior management of listed
companies, securities institutions, settlement and clearing institutions, as well as
professionals, etc, will be banned from the securities industry in the case of
contravention of the regulations.
      At present, more than 250 sets of measures and regulations relating to stock
markets have been laid down. A basic regulatory framework on China’s stock market
has already been formed.  In July 1 1999, the long-awaited Securities Law of the PRC
came into effect. It is the first comprehensive national law on securities in China.
Securities Law
      The Securities Law is intended to provide a framework for rationalizing the great
many extant, narrower rules, measures and regulations that touch on securities matters,
which apply to the issue and trading of shares, corporate bonds and other securities.
(Excluding Hong Kong) Shares of companies reserved for foreign investment, like B
shares and H shares, are governed by measures made by the State Council.
     Various restrictions are placed on the kinds of individuals and funds that may enter
the market. Most stringently, officers and employees of stock exchanges, securities
companies, and securities regulatory authorities may not engage in share trading,
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whether directly or indirectly. Bank funds may not enter the market. Many kinds of
activities are outlawed. Brokers may not lend stocks to their customers. State-owned
enterprises may not engage in share “ speculation”, and so on.
      In an effort to counter the speculation and volatility in China’s stock market, the
Securities Law imposes more discipline on, and clearly defines the liabilities of, all
market participants, including listed companies, underwriters, brokers dealers, and
law and accounting firms. But it is the securities companies that are being forced to
change the most, in ways that will have a deep and lasting impact on the development
of the market.
      Securities companies will be divided into comprehensive and brokerage securities
companies. Those in the first category may offer a full range of services, from
brokerage and trading on their own accounts, to underwriting new issues. Those in the
second category can only act as brokers for their clients. To qualify as a
comprehensive securities company, a company must have a minimum capitalization
of RMB 500 million (US$ 60 million). Among more than 90 securities companies
presently, only about 16 larger companies will be able to satisfy this requirement
according to appendix 2. It is also understood that some smaller companies do not
even have a large enough capital to qualify as brokers. The order to change has been
signaled, and restructuring, merger, recapitalization and closure of securities
companies will be anticipated.
      Trust companies must be separated from banks, insurance companies and
securities companies, and as such may no longer engage in securities business. It is
estimated that almost all of the trust and investment companies in existence,
numbering more than 240, are engaged in securities business, which accounts for
about 60 percent of their turnover. After July 1999 if these companies are to stay in
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the securities business, they must either convert or merge with other companies into
securities companies, or spin off their securities operations as separate securities
companies, or take other appropriate actions.
      The Securities Law attaches severe liabilities, which set forth detailed penalties
for different kinds of violations. Chapter 11 of Securities Law contains 36 sections on
the details of administrative punishment for violations of Securities Law, including
the forfeiture of unlawful income, fines, and business license revocation. Seventeen of
those sections impose criminal liability, which is unusual for a commercial law.
      In short, consistent with the central government’s open stance on these matters,
the Securities Law embraces as its goals the standards of advanced securities markets
around the world, namely, that a securities market should be open, accessible and fair.
Subsumed under this cardinal principle is the requirement that market participants’ act
voluntarily, honestly and for good consideration; the exhortation that laws be
observed; and the prohibition of deception, insider dealing and market manipulation.
The impact this new law will have on the market should not be underestimated.
  
Conclusion
     The birth of the two stock exchanges was a milestone in the history of China’s
securities industry. It not only promoted the development of the securities industry,
but also had a significant impact on both social and economic advances. It accelerated
the further reform of economic system, especially in the field of experimentation in
shareholding and modern enterprise systems, and played a very important role in the
formation of China’s fully-fledged capital market.
     China’s stock markets have grown very rapidly since its inception. It has emerged
from virtually nonexistence to become a major segment of the country’s financial
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sector and also grew from small to large and from a regional market to a national
market. The numbers of listed companies, intermediaries and investors increased
rapidly. A relatively sound stock market system especially regulatory and supervisory
system has been built.
      However, China’s stock market is still in a very primitive stage of development.
The size of markets is far smaller than that of other emerging markets, let alone
mature markets. In 1995, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP was 95.5
percent in the United States, 83.5 percent in Japan and 121.7 percent in Britain,
respectively. The ratio was also very high in many emerging markets. It was 259.4
percent in Malaysia, 194.8 percent in Singapore, 46.4 percent in South Korea,
respectively, but in China, only 5.96 percent in 1995.11
      China’s stock market that initiated from the socialist system is characterized by
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy and imprinted many
elements of the planned economy. Lots of problems and issues, left over by history,
remain to be solved. For example, the non-tradable state and legal person shares, the
segmentation of A and B shares and standardized operation of listed companies and
securities companies. The next section of this paper will discuss these issues in greater
depth.
                                                                
11 See Zhou Zhengqing (1998).
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 PART III   ISSUES FACING CHINA’S STOCK MARKET
Introduction
      The origin and early development of China’s stock market are different from
practices of western countries. From very beginning China’s stock market is hedged
under the central planning system that is doomed to be an abnormal. The emergence
of the stock market in China was the result of top down transformation of China’s
economic system. To some extent, the public ownership and a non-market economy
usually do not provide the conditions necessary for the development of a truly
functional stock market.
     After the birth of new China, the state adopted the centralized planned system for
socialist construction for more than 30 years, but the result was not satisfactory. Since
the end of 1970s, the government launched economic reforms and tried to promote
socialist productivity by experimenting with various development models. It has been
proved that the shareholding system is an effective approach to promote both socialist
economic reform and development, especially the reform of state-owned enterprises.
       The shareholding system grew exceptionally fast as soon as China adopted
transitional economy. Due to the inexperience of policymakers many rules and
regulations are lagging behind to ensure the growth and supervision of shareholding
firms and stock markets. Therefore, it is inevitable that many of the problems were
not solved at that time.
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State Shares and Legal Person Shares
Reasons for Introduction of State Shares and Legal Person Shares
      As of the middle of 1980s, the reform of the Chinese economy stepped into a
transitional period between two economic systems. Before 1992, the planned
economy was in a dominating position and the market economy grew in a rather
limited scale. The historical problems left over within the stock markets mainly
originated from the period before 1992.
       During the period of economic transition, economic operation still followed the
traditional planning management model. The stock system was a totally new field for
Chinese policy-makers. They were accustomed to taking the issues of state shares and
legal person shares into account only from the viewpoint of the planned economy.
The government deregulated the management of the traditional planned economy
slowly and gradually allowed the market mechanisms to work. It was difficult for the
government to legislate appropriately in matters concerning the stock markets, as they
had no prior experience of such capitalist systems.
      Prior to the economic reform, the system of unitary ownership of enterprises had
been in existence for decades. The ownership structure of an enterprise either took the
form of state-ownership or collective-ownership. Under the centralized planning
economy, the state had discretionary power to set the price of all products that were
produced by state-owned enterprises regardless of the size of supply and demand, as
well as the allocation and transference of assets among state-owned enterprises. The
collectively owned firms, however, could set the price based on the principle of
exchanges of equivalent. The state could not interfere in their financial affairs, such as
profit allocation and employment of workers. Under this system, the standards of
price setting were different between state-owned enterprises and collectively owned
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firms. If two forms of ownership existed within one enterprise, it would lead to two
results - either the state encroaching on collective assets or the collective encroaching
on the state’s assets. The segregation of different forms of ownership seemed to be
reasonable under the planned economy system. But meanwhile, the people were
shackled with the ideologies of the traditional ownership. Following the emerging of
the shareholding system, there was concern regarding the trading of state shares and
legal person shares within the policy making circle: it may erode the state’s position
of majority shareholding in state-owned enterprises. They were afraid that trading of
state/legal person shares would damage the state’s holding of its assets with the result
of losing their dominant position in national economy.
      On the other hand, during the period of shareholding experiments, the largest
shareholder was usually the line ministry that was in charge of this enterprise. Under
the planned economy, the line ministry and local bureaus took charge of the
management of state assets that fell within their jurisdiction to the limits of their
authority. The state assets that were controlled by one department were difficult to be
transferred to the other departments. This system resulted in a departmental system
and of management style of state assets. After the emergence of shareholding
enterprises, the departmental system was almost broken down mainly due to the
existence of cross-shareholdings among enterprises as legal person shares.  If the state
and legal person shares are allowed to be traded in the secondary market, it will
become difficult to control the shares that the authorities owned before. It also means
that the power of the authorities could be laid aside. The authorities responsible for
the management of state assets were surely set against the trading of state/legal person
shares. In 1992, the State Economic System Reform Committee proclaimed the
regulations concerning companies limited by shares and limited liability companies,
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which clearly divided the companies shares into three forms: state shares, legal person
shares and individual shares. Thus, the departmental system of ownership could be
maintained as long as restriction on the trading of state/legal person shares was
observed and such assets were not allowed to flow out to other departments or
individuals.
      With the rapid growth of stock markets, restriction on trading state/legal person
shares has showed lots of disadvantages. For instance, the value of state assets cannot
be increased; the enterprises’ assets cannot be optimized and restructured and the
advantages of shareholding economy cannot be realized to its fullest extent. The
tremendous amount of untradable shares limits the function of stock markets as a
mechanism to evaluate the management performance of listed companies and poses a
serious threat on the secondary market, which made the government unable to solve
this problem in time.
 Restrictive elements on Trading of State Shares and Legal Person Shares
      At present, the total amount of untradable shares is almost 2 times as current
tradable shares in the market, of which the state shares accounted for 34.25 percent of
total shares in 1998 according to table 3-1. In addition, the data on December 30,
1997 shows that a total of the market capitalization of tradable A shares was RMB
478.497 billion, while total market capitalization of untradable A shares was RMB
1221.383 billion on that day, which was 2.55 times of tradable A shares.12 The
impacts on the stock markets will be tremendously serious if such a huge amount of
shares are listed on the exchanges. It may lead to a crash of the market to a large
extent because of limited market capacity and vulnerable investors. From the policy-
                                                                
12 See Jin Dehuan (1998).
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makers points of view, it must take time to nurture the rational investors, especially
individual investors. In addition, even if the state/legal person shares could be traded
in secondary market, such huge amount shares might form the power to manipulate
the market. This will not only shake the vulnerable China’s stock markets, and
undermine the stock market development, but probably also cause serious social
unease.
     As common shares, state shares and legal person shares should enjoy the same
rights and profits, as the individual shares should. However, individual investors lack
the equal rights compared to state and enterprises holders because of unequal
purchasing prices. In general, if the state shareholder purchases the shares at their face
value, say, one yuan per share, the legal persons can only buy at 3.5 yuan per share.
But the individual investors are supposed to buy their shares at the fixed price of at
least six times or even more than ten times the stock face value. If the government
allows the state/legal person shares to enter into the market without reasonable
compensation for the individual shareholders, it is not only be unfair to the latter but
also detrimental to stock market development. Moreover, when listed companies split
their shares, the state usually doesn’t have enough capitals to buy these splitting
shares, and has to transfer the ownership to other legal persons or individuals. If
things continue in this way, the percentage of state equity will decrease rapidly over
the years. Once the state/legal person shares are allowed to be listed on the market,
the problem could become more complex and serious. Therefore, an efficient state
assets management and operation mechanism will guarantee the trading of state/legal
<Table 3-1>    State Shares of the Listed Companies ( Billion)
                           1992         1993          1994         1995        1996         1997         1998
State shares        2.85          19.022       29.647      32.867     42.301       61.228      86.551
Total shares       6.887         38.773       68.454      84.842    121.945     194.267    252.679
Percentage         41.38         49.11         43.31        38.74      35.42         31.52        34.25
Source: China Securities Newspaper, May 10, 1999.
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person shares on the market and ensure the same rights will be enjoyed among the
individuals, state and enterprises shareholders. The most important thing is to
safeguard the value of state assets to be maintained and added.
      Another important restrictive element on trading of state/legal person shares is the
lack of a favorable environment such as mature investors, stable capital inflow, and a
perfect legal system.
      Due to the deep-rooted ideologies formed under the central planning system and
the high risk in stock markets, many people would rather put their cash in banks than
invest in stocks. Right now, deposits and cash mainly composed the financial assets of
urban residents in China.  Table 3-2 shows that the composition of financial assets in
China. So, how to change the concept of depositors is quite important for trading
state/legal person shares.  In addition, although the basic principles on the stock
markets are fairness, openness and justice, due to the heavy influences of planned
economy, the competent security authorities always administered stock markets with
lots of government intervention.  The management of stock markets was usually done
through administrative means rather than laws.
<Table 3-2>    Composition of Financial Assets in China, 1978-1995 (RMB Billion)
                                                                  1978          1986          1991          1995
1.A total of financial assets                      321.75      1596.82      4640.40     12726.58
2.Percentage of non-banking
financial assets to the total(%)                  0.40           2.80           6.60            10.10
3.The total financial assets of
enterprises and residents                          152.75       748.16       2131.46      7463.40
4.Percentage of deposits and cash
to the total financial assets of
enterprises and residents (%)                    99.02        91.00          87.12           89.86
5.Percentage of non-banking
financial assets to the total
financial assets of enterprises
and residents (%)                                       0.98          6.00           12.58            17.11
6.In which (5), % of stock market
value to non-banking financial assets        0.00          0.00           1.86              6.93
Source: Wang, Liya, Present Situations of China’s Capital Market, 1997.
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Analysis of Trading Models for State Shares and Legal Person Shares
      To regularize and internationalize China’s stock market, the problem of trading
state/legal person shares on the markets must be addressed first. But obviously, under
the present condition, it is impossible to raise a huge amount of money to make all the
state shares and legal person shares listed on the markets. Almost RMB1000 billion
(US$ 122 billion) or 1500 billion (US$ 182.9 billion) are required to be injected in the
markets in order to activate state/legal person shares based on their market values.
Some people proposed that issuance of new stocks should be suspended for two or
three years so as to ensure the problem solving of trading of state/legal person shares.
This suggestion might be beneficial for trading of state/legal person shares on the
markets, but the suspension of issuing new stocks could not only slow down state-
owned enterprises’ reform inevitably, but also affect the pace of entire economic
reform adversely.
      Evidently, it is unrealistic to make a package plan for trading of state/legal person
shares on the markets instantly.  But it is feasible to experiment various trading
models on state/legal person shares according to different situations and conditions
that will pave the way to eradicate the problem eventually in the foreseeable future.
The trading models involved the following:
      Changing part of state or legal person shares into preferred shares.
Compared to common shares, the preferred shares enjoy two “priorities”: one is
priority of reaping dividends. Namely, earnings of the company will be distributed to
preferred shareholders earlier than common share holders. In general, the rate of
earnings on preferred shareholders’ equity is higher than that of common shares. The
other one is priority of residual claimant. Namely, whenever the company restructures
or bankrupts, preferred shareholders have precedence to claim an indemnity. Because
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of these features, when a company issues the preferred shares, it usually attracts a
number of investors; especially those who want to reap the regular earnings. If a part
of state/legal person shares could be changed into preferred shares, it could kill two
birds with one stone. Firstly, changing the structure of ownership in order to solve the
problems of concentration of powers in a few hands. Secondly, alleviating the stress
of trading state/legal person shares on the markets. According to international practice,
preferred shares can be traded on the markets. The purpose of most shareholders
holding preferred shares, however, is mainly for the relative stable long-term earnings
rather than speculative profits by transferring shares often on the markets.
      Issuing convertible bonds.  The state or listed companies could issue a special
convertible bond. Investors who purchase the convertible bonds could convert the
bonds into shares according to the prior agreement of the time limit and price setting.
During the agreed convertible period, however, if the share price becomes higher than
convertible price as agreed, investors could convert the bonds they hold into shares. A
part of state/legal person shares can be traded through this way on the markets finally.
      Compared to treasury bonds, the interest of convertible bonds could be much
lower. State could not only raise funds immediately by issuing convertible bonds, but
also postpone the timing of trading of state/legal person shares on the markets.
Meanwhile, the convertible bond itself is one kind of tradable securities and can be
listed on the exchanges.
      Establishment of specialized investment funds. The specialized investment
fund was established to purchase state/legal person shares, especially state shares. The
investment funds could be sponsored by state owned non-financial institution and also
could be raised from the public. The minimum proportion of the funds, which must be
invested in trading of state/legal person shares, should be no less than 55 percent.
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State or listed companies could transfer all or parts of their shares to the specialized
investment fund with reasonable prices. These transferred shares could be frozen for a
certain period, say 3-5 years before they are traded on the markets.  The setup of
investment funds that are particularly used to transact state/legal person shares could
not only produce a cushion effect for market fluctuation resulted from trading of
state/legal person shares, but also make stock markets develop stably and soundly.
Furthermore, as the state-owned institutional investors, the specialized investment
fund will have a capability and responsibility to adjust the market when it comes into
distorted volatility.
      Changing state/legal person shares into employee shares or B shares and
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). For the legal person shares, it may be
more suitable to be transferred to the company’s employees.  In order to regulate
operation of employee shares, a specialized institution is suggested to be set up for
taking charge of management of employee ownership inside an enterprise. In-service
employees cannot withdraw or trade the shares. Employees can transfer employee
shares only when they retire or leave for other company.
      In China, employee shares can be traded on the markets after a certain period of
restriction pursuant to relevant regulations. But because the much lower purchase
price of the employee shares in comparison with the issuance price to the public, in
order to get premiums between the primary market and secondary market, a number
of employees sold the shares they held immediately when these share were allowed to
be traded.  To some extent, the nature of employee shares has already been changed
into “beneficial shares”, contrary to the initial purpose of issuance of employee shares.
Therefore, certain restrictions on transaction of employee shares are necessary in the
case of transferring of legal person shares to employee shares. Appendix 3 indicates
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that the U.S. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, which ties employee’s pension with
the firms’ long-term performance, is also a useful scheme to correct the short-term
behavior of the Chinese worker shareholders.
      As for selling a part of state/legal person shares to foreigners, it means to transfer
parts of state/legal person shares into B shares or ADRs. Companies, which have
issued B shares, could expand the size of issuance. Those that never issued B shares
could transfer state/legal person shares to B shares directly. At present, there are only
a few Chinese enterprises’ shares to be traded on American markets in the form of
ADRs. If this suggestion can be taken into account, more and more listed companies
will be put into overseas markets rapidly.
     Currently more than 10 models for trading state/legal person shares exist in
academic circles. However, each model has its limitations. For example, in the case of
changing state/legal person shares into convertible bonds, it needs experienced
investment banks as intermediaries. Even though approximately 90 securities
companies played the role of investment banks in China, they cannot compare in
terms of all the aspects with foreign competitors. As for transferring state/legal person
shares into B shares or ADRs, there are much more problems with it. Firstly, parts of
state or legal person ownership will be changed to foreigners’ ownership; it may
impair the development of national industry. Secondly, the state authorities have still
no final decision to justify the existence of B shares market in the long run.
      As discussed above, due to the historical reasons, the issue of state/legal person
shares is quite complex, involving both investors’ interests and prospects of stock
markets as well as the pace of economic reform. Trading of state/legal person shares
on the markets should be implemented carefully with regard to their sizes, categories
and structures of ownership, and so forth. It should adopt various trading channels in
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response to different situations of listed companies so that problems can be solved in
piecemeal with a result of healthy development of China’s stock market.
A Shares and B Shares
      Since the stock market emerged in China in the middle of 1980s, Chinese
shareholding companies have issued different stocks to different shareholders. A
shares are for Chinese citizens to buy with Renminbi. They account for the majority
of all issued shares and almost every shareholding company have A shares. Starting in
early 1992, another category of shares, B shares, which are also called “ renminbi
special shares” was introduced exclusively for foreign investors, and which are priced
in RMB, purchased with US dollars (SHSE) and HK dollars (SZSE) through selected
Chinese and foreign stockbrokers. The principal of B shares must be foreign exchange,
and the companies that issued B shares should pay the shareholders dividends with
foreign exchange converted from RMB profit at the current market exchange rate. In
theory, B share holders have the same right and bear the same obligations as A share
holders.
      By the end of July 1999, there were totally 108 B share issuers. Most of
companies that issued B shares have issued A shares, too. The A shares and B shares
are not substitutable, which means B shares are not convertible to A shares.
According to the Company Law, each share of different categories is supposed to
have the same right and equal share of the profit and property of the company, but the
segregation of stock transactions in a segmented market causes the stock prices to
vary considerably. A study showed that daily price discount for the B shares listed on
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Shanghai Stock Exchange is 65.62 percent, compared to 48.71 percent for B shares
trading on Shenzhen Stock Exchange in terms of A shares.13
      Compared to the over-speculative A share market, the B share market has been
quite inactive and stable, the reasons are probably as follows: a) The requirement of
foreign status for B share investors makes domestic investors unable to enter B share
market directly. b) The non-convertibility of B shares to A shares and strict
segregation between the A share market and the B share market mean that foreign
investors have little opportunity to control the listed companies because the majority
of shares are A shares. And also state and legal person are usually the leading
shareholders. This makes some potential huge investors, like multi-national
corporations, lack interest in the B shares market. c) The comparative lack of
transparency of the management of listed companies means foreign investors have
difficulty in evaluating the value of their shares. As a result the average price and P/E
ratio of B shares is much lower than that of A shares, in contrast with the rising A
share indices, the B share indices in Shanghai and Shenzhen have kept a flat or even
downward trend according to table 3-3.
<Table 3-3>  Trading Price of A Share and B Share in the Same Company,
                                                                      December 30, 1996 (Unit: yuan/per share)
                          A share           B share           B share converted to RMB           Multiplier
Zhenkong          4.7                  0.19                           1.58                                     2.97
Erfang               4.3                  0.17                           1.41                                     3.05
Dazhong           16.48              0.83                            6.88                                     2.40
Yongsheng        8.46                0.30                           2.49                                     3.47
Zhongqian         9.93                0.45                           3.73                                     2.66
Zhongfang         4.46                0.17                           1.41                                     3.16
Jiaodai               7.17                0.24                           1.99                                     3.60
Lujian                9.44                0.30                           2.49                                     3.80
Luntai               10.10               0.44                           3.65                                     2.77
Bingxiang         13.22               0.54                           4.48                                     2.95
Source: Shanghai Securities Newspaper, Dec 31, 1996.
                                                                
13 See Charkravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998).
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     In fact, the purposes of establishment of B share market were to raise foreign
capitals, to learn operating experiences from mature stock markets as well as
promoting internationalization of China’s stock market. At the beginning, in order to
prevent foreign capital from flowing into A share market, resulting in turmoil of
China’s stock market, both segmentation of investors and issuing model was set up
artificially. On the one hand, the segmentation of markets was a double sword to
protect currently infant China’s stock market, and was in the interest of supervision of
stock markets by authorities. But on the other hand, segmented markets between A
shares and B shares also constrained the stock market development and hampered the
circulation of stocks as well as capital financing. Therefore, to standardize the markets
along common practice in most other markets in the world, it is necessary to unify the
different types of shares and set up an integrated stock market sooner and later.
       Merging of A shares and B shares will be a tendency of development of China’s
stock market. But considering the big price gap between A shares and B shares,
tremendous untradable A shares, in which most of them are state shares and legal
person share as well as incomplete convertibility of RMB, the process might be
difficult and time-consuming. The problem should be handled with great care. Merger
of A share market and B share market through market behaviors of diversified market
players will be an important aspect that accelerate the problem solving smoothly.
To Set up Sino-Foreign Joint Investment Funds
     At the beginning of experiment of merging of A shares and B shares, the contract
closed-end investment fund may fit for current situations of A/B shares markets. The
joint investment funds must register in China. Registered capital must be no less than
US$ 100 million. For the contribution, Chinese party should hold the majority share
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of capital, for example, 51 percent to 49 percent. The funds must be mainly invested
in A share and B share markets. In order to avoid the stock price fluctuation, the
proportion of the investment fund, which is invested in the same stock, may not be
more than 5 percent. The activities of purchase or selling of joint investment funds in
the same stock on two markets can reduce the price gap between A shares and B
shares, and promote the merging of A and B shares. From any perspective, if foreign
investments are lured to the A share market in the form of closed-end Sino-foreign
joint investment fund, not only it is less risky, it can greatly promote the development
of stock market.
To Nurture Domestic Institutional Investors
     If some competent domestic institutional investors say, 3-5 institutional investors
are allowed to invest in B share market, it will be beneficial to both institutional
investors and markets development. Firstly, it could precipitate the circulation of B
shares and also animate the B share market. Secondly, it could reduce the risks for
investors themselves due to the low P/E ratio of B shares in terms of A shares. Finally,
it could enhance domestic institutional investors’ capability of management and
operation in stock markets in order to facilitate the formation of a unified stock
market.
To Open B Share Market to Domestic Investors
      In September 1996, due to the rampant speculative behaviors in B share markets,
the Chinese authorities required that securities registration companies cleared up B
share accounts in order to keep the stability of B share market. Since then, domestic
institutions and individuals have been subjecting to rigorous restrictions on trading B
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shares. With the increase of foreign exchange reserve, however, the deposits of
foreign currencies registered by domestic residents have hit a high of 40 billion US
dollars.  The foreign currency cash in hands has reached tens of billions of US dollars
by the end of 1998.14 If parts of them can be channeled into the stock market, the
circulation of B shares may be further improved so as to meet the demand of long-
term development of the markets. Moreover, if B share markets is dominated only by
foreign investors, the implementation of supervision for Chinese securities authorities
will become harder and harder. In addition, issuance mode of B shares mainly
adopted the practice of private placement, and these raised funds mainly concentrated
on medium-, and long-term investment, resulting in inactivity of B share markets for a
quite long time.
     It is worth noting that renminbi have not realized its convertibility under the capital
account. The process to achieve the goal of a fully convertibility of yuan is time-
consuming. However, an incompletely convertible yuan does not illustrate that any
trial on merging of A shares and B shares could not be performed.  In order to pave
the way of unifying the China’s stock markets, the state needs to formulate new
policies for solving this problem, such as, to arrange the special foreign exchange
quota; the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange are freely within this quota.
Another method is to draw up the specific measure for settlement of exchange on
foreign investment and profit, or to open the hedging business for foreigners who
intend to invest in A/B share markets, and so on.
                                                                
14 See Global Sources: China (1999).
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Performances of Listed Companies
Listed Companies Are not Genuine Shareholding Companies
      In China, most of listed companies initiated from state-owned enterprises. The
state-owned enterprises transformed their structures according to the requirements of
shareholding system, but the operation mode and management mechanism of many
state-owned enterprises are still in line with the planned economy model. Namely, the
corporate structure and operation mechanism has not been modernized in terms of the
requirements of company limited by shares or modern enterprise system. These
companies could not be called shareholding companies in their real sense.
      One of the main goals of China’s shareholding system reform is to clarify
property rights and delineate the roles of the state and of the enterprises. In theory, the
shareholding company should be an economic entity with clear ownership’s rights,
whose activities on production and operation should only focus on maximizing
shareholders’ profit and guaranteeing shareholders’ rights.
      The state-owned enterprises, however, are not endowed with the above
characteristics. Their property rights are usually ambiguous because the government
or other agencies exercise the roles of both shareholder and administrator. In China,
listed companies were set up through administrative procedures under the government
approval and checking rather than formed through market requirements. As a
consequence, listed companies are characterized by both equivocal shareholder and
the poorly defined ownership. Equivocal shareholder means that who can represent
the state as state shareholder is not clear, namely, who can shoulder the rights and
obligations of state ownership is not clear. The poorly defined ownership means that
shareholders’ rights cannot be protected on the one hand, what kind of rights and
obligations individual shareholders can enjoy is not definite on the other hand. At the
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same time, the lack of ownership representation in the state-owned enterprises leads
to various moral hazard problems, such as managers and workers pursuing their own
interests at the expense of the state. Although the introduction of individual
shareholders is through public listing, it has not been resulting in a clear separation of
ownership and management due to the existence of the huge state shareholders. In
many of listed companies, the board members are almost identical to the members of
the executive officers. This is regarded as a norm rather than exception. Relatively
few outside monitors can exercise strong discipline on these companies. Managers of
listed companies usually make decisions that promote their own interest but that
damage the interest of individual shareholders. In practice, the directors of board of
the listed company are only responsible for the government rather than its
shareholders.
      In addition, the lack of clear definition of the ownership of listed companies
undermines corporate governance because it leaves the issue of who is able to be
monitoring the boards of directors and managers of the company. Meanwhile, the
operation of the listed companies remains subject to quite extensive administrative
control and intervention from various levels of government, causing serious incentive
problems that reduces the companies’ efforts in enhancing performance. It seems
difficult to achieve the goal of a completed separation of the administrative,
regulatory and social functions from the commercial functions of enterprises.
Listed Companies Deviate from Standards
      Most of the listed companies are more interested in raising funds and making
profits through splitting more new stocks in the form of premium placement to
original shareholders than in improving their management and lowering operational
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cost. They invest with raised funds into the fields that not related to their major
business without the agreement of shareholders. Some of the listed companies
engaged in speculative behaviors in stock markets, and a few even manipulate their
own stocks in the markets, resulting in high fluctuation of stock prices and high
operation risk of the company itself. Moreover, the listed companies that lack
transparency and enough information disclosure are far away from reaching
international practice. From 1993-1998, the cases that China Securities Regulatory
Commission investigated and prosecuted amounted to 118, of which 91 related to
securities contravention and crime. Penalties for 25 listed companies that violated
relevant regulations and law included fines, confiscation of profits and suspension of
listing.
Low Efficiency of Listed Companies
      Because listed companies are not genuine shareholding companies, they are not
able to operate according to the principles of standard shareholding companies in
practice. Managers of listed companies do not have incentives to improve their
management to maximize the profit of shareholders. According to the report of 1998,
the income of listed companies averaged 0.24 yuan per share, while 73 listed
companies, or 7.12 percent of the total, operated at a loss.15 For the lower profit level
in comparison with the very high stock price, even the dividends of well-performing
companies could hardly meet the expectation of their shareholders. It is worth
worrying that annual rate of return of listed companies decreased over years according
to table 3-4. It is extremely urgent to improve the quality of listed companies and
perfect the internal management system, strictly separate the administration and
                                                                
15 See global sources (1999).
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enterprise management functions, standardize the corporate decision-making
procedure and strengthen the responsibility of directors.
Measures for Standardizing Behaviors of Listed Companies
To improve operation and management mechanism
      The key of China’s stock market development lies in fundamental changes of the
operation mechanism of listed companies and also lies in enforcement of standardized
management in accordance with principles of shareholding system.  Under the current
conditions, operation and management mechanism of listed companies has to be
readjusted and regulated rigidly.
      In the case of state holding, it requires to clearly define the ownership right of
state assets.  Without a clarified right of state ownership, we can hardly talk about
transformation of state-owned enterprises’ operation mechanism. To solve this
problem, the administrative appointment system of managers of listed companies has
to be abolished. The boards of directors and managers should be selected by
shareholders in an open forum. In addition, the right of individual shareholders must
be guaranteed by law. Individual shareholders should possess the power to select
members of the boards, and to have the opportunity to be a member of the boards.
      The tremendous untradable state/legal person shares are also the barriers on
changing the operation mechanism of listed companies into that of the genuine
shareholding companies. At present, almost 65 percent state/legal person shares are
<Table 3-4>   Changes in Profit or Loss of Listed Companies, 1993-1999 (Unit: yuan)
                                     1993        1994       1995      1996       1997       1998       1999
Earning per share          0.35         0.32        0.25       0.23        0.25        0.24        0.10
Loss per share                               0.13        0.20       0.37        0.53        0.49        0.21
Ratio of Loss-incurred
companies to the total (%)            0.68        5.26       5.85        5.53        7.12        9.52
Source:  Securities Research, Jan 1999.
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untradable ones, therefore the rest 35 percent tradable shares can not bind operation
behaviors of listed companies. For individual shareholders, they rarely joined the
shareholders meeting, and they do not even have much information about the listed
company they held shares. Therefore, a fundamental factor to bind the behaviors of
listed companies on the markets is the issue of tradability of total shares. Likewise,
speculations can also be reduced on the fully tradable stock markets. For trading the
state/legal person shares, we have already discussed in the previous section.
To enhance transparency and improve information disclosure
      China’s accounting reforms have been largely responsive to enterprises’ reform.
By the end of 1998, eight specific accounting standards were promulgated in China in
a bid to make listed companies more transparent. In early 1998, China’s Ministry of
Finance proclaimed a Revised Accounting System for shareholding companies, which
governs the preparation of financial statements for listed companies, especially for
companies listing overseas (H shares and B shares). The Revised Accounting System
set out for various types of provisions, such as doubtful debt provisions, provisions
for realizable values of inventory and shot-term investments, and provisions for
permanent diminution in value of long-term investment. The new requirements
narrow the profit gap between China statutory accounts and International/Hong Kong
financial statements. This improves the creditability of China’s statutory financial
statements and helps to lift the corporate image of B share and H share companies.
       A share companies, on the other hand, are not required to prepare
International/Hong Kong financial statement, and traditionally, make virtually no
provisions. Actually, allowing rather than requiring A share companies to make
provisions gives them the opportunity to build up their provisions gradually, and
hence avoid a fatal hit on their balance sheets in a single year.
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      Apart from the requirements for making provisions, the Revised Accounting
System also introduces a vast number of new or revised accounting treatments that
bring the accounting practices of China’s listed companies very close to international
practice. Moreover, the disclosure requirements introduced by the Revised
Accounting System are very comprehensive, and match the disclosure requirements in
many countries, which are continuing to improve the transparency of listed companies.
       However, as analyzed above, the problem of the lack of transparency for listed
companies is mainly because of the lack of efficient management of supervision by
authorities resulted from the lack of the professional and independent auditing. As a
result, the application of the detailed accounting standards may not be able to generate
financial statements with “a true and fair view”. On the one hand, information
disclosure of listed companies is neither comprehensive nor in time; on the other hand,
the listed companies disclosed information or financial statements usually inaccurate
in order to earn manipulation and speculative profit. Therefore, rigid enforcement of
the accounting rules and strengthening judiciary power are the keys to solve this
problem.
To change ownership structure and strengthen corporate governance
     The strengthened corporate governance is essential to improve the performances of
listed companies. It includes that improvement of operation and management
mechanism, and diversification of the ownership, and also equipment of a proper
institutional framework of checking and balance.
      Ownership structure significantly affects the performance of listed companies. It
directly addresses the question of how corporate governance mechanism can be
changed and whether outside investors’ interests can be better protected by law. In
China, a typical listed company has a mixed ownership structure with three
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predominant groups of shareholders: state shares, legal person shares, and individual
shares – each holding approximately 30 percent of total outstanding shares. The
composition of the boards of directors and the supervisory committee, however, is not
proportional to the ownership. It is striking to see that individual shareholders have no
more than 0.3 percent of the seats on average, even though they possess
approximately one third of the total outstanding shares. The state is over represented
on the board: 50 percent of positions are filled by government officials. Likewise, the
composition of the supervisory committee is also characterized by an extremely low
presence of individual shareholders, approximately 0.5 percent for Shenzhen Stock
Exchange listed companies and zero for the sample companies listed on Shanghai
Stock Exchange.16
      It seems clear that both the state and legal person rely on their control over the
board to influence corporate policies and to protect their interests. The vast majority
of individual investors are small shareholders and their interests are not protected.
Individual shareholders are in a disadvantageous position because of the lack of proxy
voting procedures. Almost no individual shareholders are on the board of directors or
on the supervisory committee.
     Therefore, increasing outside participation by appointing non-state representatives
to the companies’ boards of directors is very important. Board members who are
selected from different regions and have diverse backgrounds are also the keys. The
internal incentive structure of listed companies must be reformed by diversifying the
state ownership and by introducing other forms of large shareholders, like institutional
investors. Compared to the individual investors, the large institutional investors will
be less likely to behave as a free rider. They have the incentive and the power to
                                                                
16 See Xu and Wang (1999).   
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monitor and control the behavior of the management and have played a significant
role in corporate governance.
Conclusion
      The shareholding system is the fundamental of stock markets development. In
China, the shareholding system initiated from socialist country was determined by the
historical conditions at that time. All these issues we talked about in this section were
left over by history and happened under a special background – the transition from
planned economy to market economy. The untradability of state/legal person shares
and the completely segmented markets of A shares and B shares make China’s stock
market a peculiar one. To standardize the behaviors of listed companies along with
the common practice in most other markets in the world, we have to clarify the role
that state plays as an owner within the territory of management and supervision in
listed companies. Therefore, the issues of trading of state/legal person shares; merging
of A shares and B shares and standardizing behaviors of listed companies are quite
complex and controversial in current China, and it is challenging too.
     In 1995, as an extension of shareholding experiment, the government started the
experiment with the “modern enterprise system”. The shareholding system is the
major composition of experiment for modern enterprise system. However, the
function of shareholding system has been not shown fully.  The main reason is
because many preconditions for its efficient functioning have not been satisfied or
even absent.  The most important condition for it is a clear defined ownership and
corporate governance structure. Consistent with this system, the corporatized state-
owned enterprises are required to set up boards of directors that represent the interests
of the owners, and a well-designed mechanism that ensures the board members
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protecting the interests of the owners indeed. However, due to the property right and
share ownership structure in China, the incentive and binding system are not able to
be set up completely, resulting in inherent drawbacks within Chinese shareholding
system. And it also results in a tremendous amount of untradable state shares and
legal person shares, a segmentation of stock markets and the poor performances of
listed companies, and so forth.
      In sum, establishment of the genuine shareholding company consistent with the
requirements of the modern enterprise system is the key to develop a fully-fledged
stock market. It is predicted that various problems hindering stock markets from
growing along the international practice will be solved within 10-15 years. The
further reform of economic system, including the property right reform, will pave the
way for formation of a unified and integrated China’s stock market in the foreseeable
future.
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 PART IV   PROCESS AND PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF CHINA’S STOCK MARKET
Introduction
      Since the mid 1980s, to follow the tide of globalization the securitized financing
has come into play in the international markets. As an emerging stock market, China
has been growing in an astonishing pace. But to match the perfect standard of
international stock markets particularly in terms of the degree of securitization,
China’s stock market is still in its infant stage.
      Internationalization is not only a must for the development of China’s stock
market, but also a need for opening up of Chinese economy to adopt international
practice. Attempts to narrow the gap between China’s stock market and other well-
established stock markets have been going on since the very beginning of China’s
stock markets establishment, which produced multiple effects and laid a foundation
for further internationalization of China’s stock market. The issuance of B shares, H
shares, N shares and ADRs has attracted a considerable number of foreign investors
and thereby have contributed a great deal to the internationalization of China’s stock
market.
      By the end of June 1999, there were 107 B shares with a total capitalization of
RMB 20.718 billion (US$ 2.53 billion) on the market. 43 overseas listed companies
have raised more than US$ ten billion by April 1998. Of 43 companies, 31 were listed
in Hong Kong, eight were dual listed in Hong Kong and US, two dual listed in Hong
Kong and London, one was solely listed in US and one solely in Singapore.17
                                                                
17 See Introduction to Overseas Listings (1999).
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B Share Market and Overseas Listings
      February 21, 1992, the listing of Zhenkong B share on Shanghai Stock Exchange
raised the curtain of Chinese enterprises financing overseas. The basic requirements
for the issuance of B shares are that the stock companies must be profitable for at least
two consecutive years; they possess sufficient foreign exchange revenues to pay
dividends and cash bonuses; and they provided financial statements and earning
forecasts for three consecutive years. The issuance of B shares was the first step of
internationalization of China’s stock market. Since then, a number of listed companies
started to issue B shares. With sustained growth of Chinese economy, the size of B
share market expanded gradually. It attracted the overseas investors to China’s stock
market.  The system of transaction and settlement for B shares has been greatly
improved. Lots of foreign security brokers were involved in the underwriting and
transaction of B shares. By August 1997, there were 107 B share special seats of
brokers in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange altogether, of
which, 28 foreign investment banks possessed their own seats in Shanghai Stock
Exchange only.
       Apart from the substantial development of B share market, the volatility and
stagnation of B share market were also the main concerns of policy-makers. In
retrospect of B shares on secondary markets, B share index increased between 75 and
100 percent in 1993. From September 1994, B share index declined sharply and
remained sluggish for almost two years. The index soared during 1996; however,
much of the activity has been attributed to illegal speculation by Chinese investors.
      At the beginning, there is quite an enthusiastic initial response to the introduction
of B shares, and the demand for B shares is high. But due to lack of the uniform
guidelines, this enthusiasm has soon turned sour which led the price to plummet.
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Other reasons include nonstandard accounting practices, a shortage of information on
listed companies, a lack of appliance to publish annual reports. Since 1996, the State
Council promulgated a series of regulations on B share issuance and underwriting.
China Securities Regulatory Commission gradually perfected pre-selection rules,
examination and approval standards, and supervision regulations while striving to
improve the quality of listed B share companies, and also expanded B share market
size. This shows Chinese government’s determination to continue to develop actively
and steadfastly the B share market.
     Compared to B share market, overseas listings showed more transparent and
standardized information disclosure and also they are less volatile than B shares and
therefore offer better returns. They are more successful for their reputation and stock
turnover.
      Even as China proceeds with a multi-market approach, Hong Kong is emerging
increasingly as a favored venue for overseas offerings – H shares.
      At the end of 1993, the first two H shares “Qingdao Pijiu” and “Shanghai Shihua”
were listed on Hong Kong stock market. Most listed companies in Hong Kong stock
market are large restructured state-owned enterprises, more than 70 percent of which
are related to pillar industries that have strategic importance, such as steel-making,
telecommunication, automobile industries. On August 8, 1994, the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange announced officially Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise Index, which showed
that H shares, backed by Chinese enterprises, have won the recognition of Hong Kong
investment circle and foreign investors.
    The Hong Kong listed H shares paved the way for their later issuance in New York
stock market.  In July 1993, Zhongguo Shihua became the first H share that was listed
on New York Stock Exchange in the form of ADR. Shandong Huaneng, as the first N
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share listed on NYSE directly, issued 23.374 million ADRs with the raised capital of
US$ 333.1 million in 1997.
       Given the future potential of China’s overseas shares, a series of policy measures
were undertaken by China Securities Regulatory Commission to promote
standardized operation of overseas listed companies, for example, the Circular on
Further Strengthening the Management of Stock Issuance and Listing Outside
Territory (1997). In 1998, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State
Economic and Trade Commission have issued Measures on Promoting Standardized
Operations and In-depth Reform of Overseas Listed Companies. The key of the
Measures is to raise requirements for overseas listed companies with regard to
standardized operation by increasing transparency and deepening restructuring. Most
of the overseas listed companies have operated within the boundaries of law and
observed information disclosure requirements. Some companies have embarked upon
a path of continuous growth through overseas listing. Success in international markets
will require that the better companies be chosen for overseas listing. There is no doubt
that the Chinese government will stick to its policy of raising funds through
international capital markets, with an effort of increasing the degree of
internationalization of China’s stock market.
Openness of China’s Stock Market and Foreign Participation
      China is opening its stock markets step by step to foreign financial institutions,
and official statements have affirmed “national treatment” as the eventual objective
for financial liberalization. To date, foreign institutions have made modest inroads
into the securities sector.
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      Foreign securities companies in China have a low operational status. They
(investment banks) cannot establish branches or subsidiaries, and entry into China’s
stock market must be through joint venture only. With the exception of the China
International Capital Corporation, foreign securities companies operate through
representative offices. The number of foreign representative offices has increased
slowly from 40 at the end of 1994 to 58 at the end of 1997.
      The foreign securities companies are limited to B shares transaction and subject to
government approval to underwriting and they are prohibited from introducing new
domestic financial products. These offshore securities companies mostly operate as
special members on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange or in
the number of limited cases through agency relationships with local securities
companies operating on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
      On November 15, 1996, China Securities Regulatory Commission specified a new
framework for the overseas securities companies in B share market with the
promulgation of the Administration of Qualifications of Domestic and Foreign
Securities Trading Institutions for Engagement in Foreign Investment Shares Business
Tentative Provisions (B Share Provisions). These measures require foreign securities
companies to apply to the China Securities Regulatory Commission for a qualification
certificate. The foreign securities companies which are licensed to do securities
business in their parent companies’ place of domicile must meet a number of
threshold criteria, including having RMB 50 million (US$ 6 million) and RMB 120
million (US$ 14.6 million) in net assets for trading and underwriting foreign
investment shares. At the end of 1998, there were about 40 foreign securities
companies trading B shares on Shanghai Stock Exchange compared to about 50
63
domestic companies, and 15 on Shenzhen Stock Exchange compared to 60 domestic
companies.18
     Morgan Stanley, as the major foreign shareholder in the newly established China
International Capital Corporation, which established in June 1995 with a capital of
US$100 million, may get an inside track on opportunities to participate in non-B share
activities, including pilot projects for the Sino-foreign investment funds. During the
WTO negotiations, both the EU and the US representatives wanted foreign securities
companies to be able to broker and underwrite domestic A shares.
      In short, foreign securities companies in China currently occupy an exceptionally
peripheral role in domestic markets, with a limited and restricted market share of
business activity. Yet these foreign institutions play an important role in bringing
modern financial business practices to China and they are awaiting further
liberalization and internationalization of China’s stock market.
      As for foreign investors, foreign fund managers are not permitted to manage
domestic investment funds. In an effort to open up the fund management industry and
raise professional standards, a draft national regulation, tentatively entitled
Administrative Measures for Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Funds (the JV Fund
Regulations), is expected to be enacted in the near future. The Regulations are
expected to permit the formation of Chinese-foreign joint venture fund investment
companies. A committee set up in May 1999 has started drafting the JV Fund
Regulations. China Securities Regulatory Commission has indicated that the
Regulations will provide the framework for foreign investors to set up joint venture
fund management companies with Chinese investors.
                                                                
18 See Semkow (1999).
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Comparisons with Other Stock Markets in the World
Market Size
      Compared with stock markets of other countries, especially emerging markets, the
size of China’s stock market is too small to allocate resources effectively. Its slow
pace of growth could not keep pace with the demand of economic development in
terms of the small function the stock markets played in entire national economy. The
table 4-1 and table 4-2 indicate that the big gap between China and other well-known
markets in terms of the listed company size and growth rate of market size.
      In addition, the ratio of securitization is a major index for measuring stock market
function and development level in national economy of a country. In general, the
securitization ratio is the ratio of total market capitalization of securities to GDP.  The
higher the securitization ratio, the more important the role of stock markets in the
national economy of a country. By the end of 1994, the total market capitalization of
the United States stock market was around US$ 4500 billion, and US$ 3500 billion in
<Table 4-1>    Comparison of the Size of the Listed Companies,1994 (US$ Billion)
                                       Average         Market            Average               Negotiable market
                                       market           capitalization    size of                 capitalization /
                                      capitalization   / GDP (%)     listed companies   deposit (%)
Western stock markets
(US, UK, Germany,
France)                              1803.4         74.65                    0.92                     n.a.
Asian stock markets
(Singapore, S. Korea
Taiwan, Hong Kong)         211            91.20 (1990)         0.53                      25
China’s stock market         55.3            7.92                      0.15                     3.5
Source: Securities Markets Guide, Apr 1996.
<Table 4-2>     Comparison of the Growth Rate of Market Size (%)
1990-1994               Korea  Singapore  Hong Kong  Malaysia  Thailand  Philippine  China
Average growth
rate of total capital    15          30             34                42             52             70             4
Source: Shanghai Securities Newspaper, Apr 14, 1996.
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Japan, but only US$ 44 billion in China.19  Table 4-3 shows a comparison of the ratio
of total market capitalization to GDP between China and other countries.
Assets Structure
      In China, the increase of the size of financial assets of enterprises mainly
depended on the increased expansion of deposits and loans of banks. The indirect
financing played a major role in the markets in terms of the direct financing through
the various portfolios. Since the economic reform, the proportion of direct financing
increased rapidly, especially stock financing, but the stock market development is still
very primitive in terms of the small value of stock financing with respect to other
financing tools. In comparison with other mature markets, there is a long way to go
for China’s stock market. Table 4-4 and table 4-5 show the composition of enterprises
<Table 4-3>    Comparison of the Ratio of Total Market Capitalization to GDP (%)
            China       Japan       Britain      S. Korea       Singapore      Hong Kong     Thailand
1992    3.93         68.10       93.00         36.30           300.50            189.40             60.13
1993   10.20        77.80      122.70        42.60           545.80            354.20             68.24
1994    7.92         86.40      123.90        50.90           609.60            229.90             93.58
1995    5.96         72.70      125.30        40.20           479.30            198.20             88.68
1996   14.52        67.50      142.70        28.70           162.80              n.a.                  n.a.
1997   23.40         n.a.           n.a.            n.a.               n.a.                 n.a.                  n.a.
1998   24.50         n.a.           n.a.            n.a.               n.a.                 n.a.                  n.a.
Source: Choices Facing the 21st Century, 1999.
<Table 4-4>    Composition of Enterprises Financing in China (RMB billion)
       1995          1996         1997        1998
Volume       % Volume        % Volume       % Volume      %
Total raised capital
1. loans from finan-
cial institutions
2.direct financing
    a. stock financing
    b. bond financing
    c. commercial bill
        financing
1151.8       100     1345.8        100     1479.5       100     1394.8     100
 1014         88       1114           82.8    1140          77       1152       82.6
137.8         12       231.8          17.2    339.5         23        242.8     17.4
 15             1.3      42.5            3.2      128.5         8.7       84           6.0
 21.6          1.9      26.8            2         25              1.7       14.7        1.1
101.2         8.8      162.5          12       186           12.6      144.1     10.3
Source: Choices facing the 21st Century, 1999.
                                                                
19 Choices Facing the 21s t Century (1999).
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     Statistics showed that individual investors accounted for 99.51 percent of total
investors by the end of 1997 in China’s stock market according to table 4-6. Out of
0.49 percent institutional investors, trust and investment companies, securities
companies, or a few securities investment funds composed the majority of
institutional investors. The investment funds on the markets mainly were consisted of
institutional short-term investment. Compared to the mature markets, the number of
China’s domestic funds is very small. Table 4-7 shows that the structure of shares
held by investors in the United States. Of all the shareholders, institutional investors,
especially various funds played an important role in the US stock market.
      In November 1999, the Chinese government allowed the insurance companies to
get into stock market by buying securities investment funds. The entry into stock
market indirectly of the insurers will benefit both the insurers and China’s stock
market.
Market Operation
 <Table 4-5>    Capital Composition of the Corporations in Selected Countries (%),
                                                                                                                   1966-1970
                                                     The U.S.                Britain                 France
1. Internal capital                         69.4                       51.4                     65.0
2. External capital                        30.6                       48.6                     35.0
a. Loans                                  12.4                       10.3                      27.4
b. Securities issuance              18.2                       38.3                     7.6
Total                                             100                        100                      100
Source: Nurture and Development for China’s Capital Market, 1999.
<Table 4-6>     Structure of Investors in Shenzhen  Stock Exchange ( 10 Thousand)
              Total            Individual           Percentage(%)          Institution        Percentage(%)
1991      25.69            25.63                  99.79                        0.06                    0.21
1992     105.05          104.91                 99.87                        0.14                    0.13
1993     353.27          352.22                 99.70                        1.05                    0.30
1994     482.99          480.72                 99.53                        2.27                    0.47
1995     555.04          555.90                 99.43                        3.14                    0.57
1996    1089.57        1085.30                99.61                        4.27                    0.39
1997    1609.78        1601.88                99.51                        7.90                    0.49
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Market Statistics Yearbook, 1993-1997.
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     In China’s stock market, the rate of transfer is incredibly high according to table 4-
8. On December 12 1996, the daily turnover was 37.4 billion yuan (US$ 4.6 billion)
in two stock markets, three times the highest daily turnover of Hong Kong, even
though the formers’ market capitalization was only one tenth of the latter’s.20 On the
New York Stock Exchange, the yearly stock transaction value was below 40 percent
of its stock market value in 1995. But in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the stock transaction
value was 4.5-9.5 times the stock market value annually in the early 1990s. And later
the rate have been between 2 and 3.5 times, which means, on average, every stock
could be sold twice or more a year.
      In addition, the average P/E ratio in mature markets is between 15 and 20. In
China’s stock market, the P/E ratio of quite a few stocks could be as high as over 500
in the early 1990s. After stock market collapse, the stock price and P/E ratio lowered
considerably. On average, the P/E ratio maintains between 30 and 45 according to
<Table 4-7>    Structure of Shareholders of Listed Companies in the US (US$ Billion)
                                       1989      1990      1991      1992     1993     1994     1995     1996
Market capitalization  3825.9    3524.8   4897.9   5456.8    6280    6263.3   8389.9  10090
Individual                   1941.6    1752.9   2675      2906.3    3249.6  3100.4  4166.6  4779.8
Insurance companies  190.5      177.8     245.5     272.8      336.4    386.5    491.9    584.9
Pension funds             609.7      592.5     686.7     822.0      925.2    921.6    1150.3  1345.3
Retirement funds of
local government       300.1      293.0     392.4     447.4      533.9    534.9    744.2     948.4
Investment funds       267.6      249.4     330.7     425.1      635.0    741.8    1061.7   1501.8
Others                        516.4      459.2     567.6     583.2      559.9    578.1    775.2     929.8
Source: Federal Reserve Board, the U. S., Capital Flow Account, 1989-1996.
<Table 4-8>    Comparison of Transfer Rates in Selected Markets
           SHSE  SZSE  NYSE  Tokuyo   Korea  London  Hong Kong  Thailand   Singapore
1992                            47           20         133          43           53             15             19
1993  341     213         53           26         187          81           61             133           84
1994  787     472         53           25         174          77           40             63             28
1995  396     180         59           27         105          78           37             40             18
1996  591     902         52           27         91            58           44             30             14
1997  362     466         66           33         146          44           91             50             56
Source: China Securities Industry Association, 1999.
                                                                
20 See People’s Daily (Dec 16, 1996).
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table 4-9. All of these evidences show that China’s stock markets characterized by a
typical emerging market is far away from reaching the practices of internationalized
stock markets.
The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Stock Market
GATS and China’s Securities’ Sector
    China’s bid to join the World Trade Organization will fundamentally impact the
world economy and will critically affect development of China’s stock market. Basic
improvements in the efficiency, transparency, and liquidity of China’s stock market
will follow China’s accession to WTO membership. Specially, changes mandated by
the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) through negotiations on
the liberalization of financial services sector will significantly influence the
development of China’s stock markets.
    The GATS has three basic principles: it covers all services except those provided in
the exercise of governmental authority; secondly, there should be no discrimination in
favor of national providers, the national treatment principle. And thirdly, there should
be no discrimination between other members of the agreement – the most favored
nation (MFN) principle. However, the agreement provides important exceptions to all
three of these principles. In the first instance, governments can choose the services in
which they make market access and national treatment commitments; and secondly,
they can limit the degree of market access and national treatment they provide. They
<Table 4-9>    Comparison of the P/E Ratio in Selected Markets
           SHSE    SZSE   NYSE  Tokuyo  Korea  London  Hong Kong  Thailand  Singapore
1992                             15.2       36.7       10.2                     13.2             16.3            19.5
1993   42.48    42.69    15.2       64.9       15.9      24.4        21.6             26.1            37.3
1994   23.45    10.28    12.7       79.5       19         16.3        10.7             19.5            26.2
1995   15.70     9.46     14          86.5       16.1      15.6        11.4             19.8            24
1996   31.32    35.42    15.7       85.3       18.7      15.5        16.4             13.3            21.5
Source: China Securities Industry Association, 1999.
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can also take exceptions even from the MFN obligation, in principle only for ten years,
in order to give more favorable treatment to some countries than to the generality.
     Exceptions to obligations and specific commitment are allowed by GATS in
certain cases. Governments may justify a measure otherwise inconsistent with GATS
by showing it is necessary to achieve one of a limited number of special policy
objectives. This exception permits a government to take discriminatory or restrictive
measures to protect consumers or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial
system.
     The new GATS financial services agreement broadly liberalizes securities markets
to foreign involvement in the underwriting and broker-dealer activities undertaken by
securities companies. Clearance and settlement may also be severely affected by
foreign competition on a state’s securities markets.
      There is no doubt that Chinese government has to make greater efforts to open its
financial service sector in order to access to WTO and GATS. Restrictions on foreign
participation in stock markets will be removed gradually after China enters the WTO.
One thing is clear: China will have to pick up the pace of reform to meet WTO
requirements by providing full market access, national treatment, and a timetable for
implementing specific measures to deregulate and open the financial sector.
Opening up China’s Stock Market Gradually
      Pursuant to GATS that does not require a fixed timetable for opening the financial
market and liberalization of financial sectors, GATS allows its members to take
discriminatory or restrictive measures to protect consumers and depositors or to
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Therefore, opening China’s
stock market should be implemented step by step in light of the lessons and
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experiences of other emerging markets, and combined with the current practices of
China’ stock markets. The opening up of China’s stock market should follow the
stages of:
      The first stage (2000 – 2005): Foreign participants will be allowed to enter the
markets in dealing or underwriting stock business with certain conditions. Obviously,
with the entry of foreign securities intermediaries into China’s market as a result of
liberalization of stock market, Chinese securities companies will have little capacity
to compete with foreign counterparts due to their small sizes of assets or relatively
lower quality on financial services. Therefore, the relaxation of restriction on foreign
financial institution’s entry into China’s stock market must be limited and done
gradually so as to protect the China’s infant securities service industry. But
meanwhile, the strength of the introduction of foreign intermediaries is also
significant. It can enhance the development of domestic securities companies through
market discipline or free competition, promoting the improvement of service quality
and expansion of service scope.
      In addition, more Sino-foreign joint capital corporations or joint investment funds
will be allowed to involve in domestic share trading. A share market is expected to
partly open at that time in order to attract more foreign direct investments. It will be
useful to merge A and B share market as early as possible and to improve the
transparency and corporate governance of listed companies.
     The second stage (2006-2010): In this stage, the stock market size, market
operation, market supervision and legal system will match the international practices
to a large extent. With the increased stability and reduced risk degree for the stock
markets, restrictions on foreign participation will be greatly relaxed. Foreign
investment banks and institutional investors will increasingly enter into the domestic
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market. Moreover, investment in foreign securities’ markets by domestic individuals
and institutions will be allowed with specified conditions. Hopefully, the problems of
trading state and legal person shares and merger of A and B shares can be solved to a
large degree during this period. The goal of a unified market will be achieved
fundamentally, and pave the way for opening China’s stock market completely.
      The third stage (After 2010): At that time, the socialist market economic system
will be established. China’s economy will also integrate completely with the world
economy. The stock market will be relatively mature and well developed in
comparison with other stock markets even with developed countries. Under the fully
convertible Renminbi, the foreign capital and foreign financial institutions can enter
into domestic market directly, and foreign companies can be listed on China’s stock
market.  It is expected that highly internationalized China’s stock market will emerge
and comply fully with all the requirements of GATS. China’s stock market will
become an important component of the world’s stock markets.
      The process of opening up of China’s stock market is only a tentative and
theoretical idea. The implementation of the proposed scheme could be complex and
difficult in practice. But anyway, in the process of gaining full access to GATS,
increased competition in securities sector will lead to increased development of
China’s stock market and finally reach the goal of a highly liberalized and
internationalized stock market in China.
Conclusion
      In China, the lower degree of internationalization of stock markets resulted mainly
from the less developed financial industry and also due to the restraints of many
structural factors.  Strict restrictions imposed on financial sector limited the scope of
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the business activities of foreign financial institutions in China’s stock market. The
incomplete convertibility of Renminbi makes an additional obstacle for foreign
investors to invest in China’s domestic markets. Moreover, in the field of regulation,
supervision, accounting system and property assessment, China’s stock market is still
far from the practices of mature international markets.
      The development of the stock market is a potentially fundamental factor for
China’s long-term economic growth. The tendency of internationalization of China’s
stock market will accelerate the economic growth and integrate domestic economy
with the rest of the world. However, the Asian financial crises of 1997-1998
demonstrated that such liberalization and integration could impose potential danger if
the process is not meticulous planned and managed with great care. Therefore, the
implementation of deregulation and liberalization of China’s stock market must base
on adequate and in-depth reform of financial sector and macroeconomic preconditions.
In a more hurry, one should take more time, as an old proverb says.
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 CONCLUSION
     China’s stock markets developed at an amazing pace and received the astonishing
accomplishments in past ten years since the establishment of two stock exchanges and
it is beginning to take shape now. It started from scratch to become a major
component of the nation’s economy. In 1996, the objective of developing securities
market was written into the national Ninth Five-year Plan and Long- term Program
for 2010.
     In an effort to meet the international standard, the government sets up the high
technological infrastructure for stock issuing and trading, and perfects a unified stock
market regulation and supervision system gradually. It is estimated that the raised
capital through the stock market was more than RMB 400 billion (US$ 48.8 billion)
by now. The stock market expands the channels of financing and investment greatly
both for enterprises and individuals and it also increases the productivity and
efficiency of state-owned enterprises. It has been one of the most positive effects for
industrial structure readjustment and production factor reallocation.
    Although the achievements of China’s stock market attracted worldwide attention,
the market characterized by an infant and emerging market is still at its primitive
stage. Lots of problems remained to be solved; some of them left over by history are
inherent inside the economic system such as the non-tradability of state shares and
legal person shares, the segmentation of A share market and B share market and the
low quality of listed company. The degree of internationalization of China’s stock
market is far away from reaching the international practices. The process of making
China’s stock market to meet the international standard completely will be difficult
and time-consuming.
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      Development of institutional investors will be a key to improve China’s stock
market. Out of institutional investors, various funds such as the pension fund,
insurance fund or a variety of investment funds will be the active players in the stock
market with the relaxation of regulations on entry into the markets.
      The expansion of market capacity is one of the preconditions for stock market
development.  To nurture investment awareness and confidence of the investors so as
to stimulate market demand is the decisive force in developing stock market steadily.
By now, the total of the household savings is around RMB 5.9 trillion (US$ 720
Billion).21 It illustrates that there exists the huge potential for expanding capacity of
the stock markets in line with the economic reform and economic growth.
     In order to gain full access to WTO and GATS, opening up of China’s securities
sector is only the matter of time. Therefore, the government must take the vigorous
action to build up the market environment and to nurture the players and investor in
the market.
     China’s stock market has a long way to go in order to adopt the practice of other
mature stock markets. The coming 15 years will be the critical time period for China’s
stock market development. In the fields of issuance system, operation mechanism,
merger and acquisition activities, regulation and supervision framework as well as
internationalization, China’s stock market will have made considerable progress. A
unification of different types of shares and a unified stock market will be formed in
the foreseeable future.
                                                                
21 See Shimizu (1999).
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Source: Hu, Jizhi, The Evolution of China Stock Market & Its Institution, 1999.
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APPENDIX 1
The Process of China’s Stock Market Development
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APPENDIX 2
Paid-in Capital and Total Assets in Top 23 Securities Companies
                                                                                               (RMB Billion)  (1998)
Securities Companies Capital Securities Companies    T-Assets
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Total
% of
total
ShenyinWanguo
Nanfang Securities
Guotai Securities
Huaxia Securities
Haitong Securities
Dongfang Securities
Lianhe Securities
Beijing Securities
Guangfa Securities
Guoxin Securities
Zhaoyin Securities
Junan Securities
Shandong Securities
Dapeng Securities
Guangda Securities
Shanghai Securities
Zhejiang Securities
Jiangsu Securities
Anshan Securities
Zhongxin Securities
Hunan Securities
Liaoning Securities
Tequ Securities
1.33
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.85
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.508
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.45
0.404
0.32
0.3
0.2351
0.22
0.20568
15.413
78%
Junan Securities
ShenyinWanguo
Nanfang Securities
Huaxia Securities
Haitong Securities
Guangfa Securities
Anshan Securities
Shanghai Securities
Lianhe Securities
Guotai Securities
Jiangsu Securities
Shandong Securities
Guoxin Securities
Zhongxin Securities
Guangdong Securities
Dapeng Securities
Guangda Securities
Pingan Securities
Xingye Securities
Liaoning Securities
Zhuhai Securities
Zhaoyin Securities
Changcheng Securities
17.56
16.73
15.53
11.06
10.27
6.91
6.5
5.68
5.43
5.1
4.81
4.72
4.54
4.12
4.06
4.03
3.98
3.42
3.26
3.24
3.15
2.98
2.72
149.8
76.70%
Source: China Securities Industry Association, 1999.
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APPENDIX 3
Employee Stock Ownership Plans
By the end of 1980s, over 11,000 U.S. firms have instituted Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Formally, these are employee pension plans, and in many
cases they have replaced more standard plans. Under an ESOP, the company acquires
an amount of its own stock that it places in trust in the plan. Each year the individual
employees are allocated some of these shares, which the ESOP then holds until they
retire or leave the firm. In the first half of 1989, U.S. corporations acquired over $19
billion of their stock to establish new ESOPs, and in some cases the employees
actually acquire the whole company through the ESOP.
ESOPs are claimed to have good incentive effects. By making employees into owners,
(particularly long-term owners), ESOPs are supposed to tie the employees’ interests
more closely to the firm’s success and motivate them better. For example, Avis, the
employee-owner car rental company, advertises that its employee cares about the
firm’s future and so will give customers better service.
Source: China’s Economic Reform in the 1990s, 1997.
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